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ACRONYMS AND ABBERVIATIONS 
The following are acronyms and abbreviations utilized in this Life Safety Analysis 
ABA Architectural Barriers Act 
ADA American with Disabilities Act 
ASET Available Safe Egress Time 
ASTM American Society for Testing 
and Materials 
cd Candela 
CO Carbon Monoxide 
DACR Digital Alarm Communicator 
Receiver 
DACT Digital Alarm Communicator 
Transmitters 
dBA Decibel (A-Weighted) 
DETACT Detector Actuation 
DOE Department of Energy 
EST Edwards Signaling 
Technology 
FACP Fire Alarm Control Panel 
FATC Fire Alarm Terminal Cabinet  
FDC Fire Department Connection 
FDS Fire Dynamics Simulator 
FED Fractional Effective Dose 
HRR Heat Release Rate 
HRRPUA Heat Release Rate per Unit 
Area 
HSSD High Sensitivity Smoke 
Detection 
IBC International Building Code 
IDC Initiating Device Circuit 
IFC International Fire Code 
ITM Inspection Testing and 
Maintenance 
KAFB Kirtland Air Force Base 
LSC Life Safety Code (NFPA 101) 
NA Notification Appliance 
NFPA National Fire Protection 
Association 
OL Occupant Load 
OS&Y Outside Screw and Yoke 
QS4 QuickStart 4 
RMV Respiratory Minute Volume 
RSET Required Safe Egress Time 
SDC Signaling Device Circuit 
SFPE Society of Fire Protection 
Engineers 
SNL Sandia National Laboratories 
SPL Sound Pressure Level 
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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1.0
The purpose of the culminating report was to perform a prescriptive-based and 
performance-based analysis on the fire and life safety systems in the laboratory building 
at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL).  The prescriptive-based analysis determined if 
the laboratory building met applicable code requirements for life safety systems.  The 
performance-based analysis conducted a series of fire scenarios to ensure the fire and 
life safety systems provided adequate egress time for occupants in the event of a fire. 
The prescriptive-based analysis was based on the Life Safety Code (LSC) and 
International Building Code (IBC).  The laboratory building is a mixed occupancy 
building.  The occupancy of each area was classified according to the use of the area 
and the hazards that exist.  The code was used to determine if the life safety systems 
were appropriate for each occupancy classification.  Life safety systems include: 
egress, fire suppression, fire alarm, and structural fire protection.  The capacity of the 
egress system was calculated and compared to the occupant load.  Analysis of the fire 
suppression system determined if the automatic sprinkler system was built to National 
Fire Protection Associate (NFPA) standards.  The sprinkler water demand was 
calculated to ensure the water supply to the building was adequate.  The fire alarm 
system was analyzed for proper spacing of detection and notification appliances.  The 
electrical demand of the alarm system was calculated to ensure the battery backup 
supply was sufficient.  The structural fire protection analysis confirmed proper materials 
and separation requirements existed in the building. 
The performance-based analysis used stakeholders’ goals and objectives to select 
appropriate fire scenarios to test the ability of the fire protection systems.  The first fire 
scenario was a lobby fire open to the main corridor with ineffective sprinklers.  The 
second scenario was a portable heater fire that ignited an office workstation.  The third 
scenario was a flammable liquid spill fire located in a high hazard area.  The Society of 
Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) hydraulic model, DETACT, and Pathfinder were used 
to calculate the required safe egress time (RSET).  Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) was 
used to calculate the available safe egress time (ASET).  A fire scenario was 
considered successful if the ASET was greater than the RSET.  A qualitative risk 
analysis was performed in order to provide a list of prioritized recommendations to 
achieve a successful fire scenario. 
The laboratory building complied with all aspects of the prescriptive-based analysis 
except for having an adequate water supply.  Both the hand calculations and the 
designer’s calculations exceeded the water supply curve.  The building did not meet the 
performance criteria for the performance-based analysis; however, most of the criteria 
can be met with a few modifications to the fire protection systems. 
In conclusion, the risk analysis identified the top five risks and suggested the following 
corrective actions: construct a wall to separate the lobby from the main corridor; ensure 
proper transportation and storage of flammable liquids; install manual pull stations at the 
exits of offices with numerous cubicles; maintain frequent inspection, testing, and 
maintenance (ITM); perform a hydraulic calculation using a computer model to verify 
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sprinkler water demand calculations.  Although the laboratory building did not pass the 
performance-based analysis, the building is not considered unsafe because of the low 
probability of a fire scenario occurring.  A quantitative risk analysis is recommended if 
the building owner would like to determine the probability of a fire scenario actually 
occurring. 
 APPLICABLE CODE 2.0
2013 NFPA 13 Automatic Sprinkler Systems Handbook 
2013 NFPA 72 National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code 
2012 Edition, NFPA 101 Life Safety Code (LSC) 
2012 International Building Code (IBC) 
2012 International Fire Code (IFC) 
20th Edition, NFPA Fire Protection Handbook (NFPA HB) 
SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 4th Edition (SFPE HB) 
DOE Standard DOE-STD-1066-99 Fire Protection Design Criteria 
Sandia Specification Section 15310 Automatic Sprinklers and Water-Based Fire 
Protection Systems, 2012 Edition 
Sandia Specification 13852 Fire Alarm Systems, 2014 Edition 
American with Disabilities Act and Architectural Barriers Act 2004 (ADA-ABA) 
 
 BUILDING INTRODUCTION 3.0
The laboratory building is located at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico.  Sandia it a multi-program laboratory operated by Lockheed 
Martin Co. for the United States Department of Energy (DOE).    The laboratory building 
is located just outside of Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) in 20 acres of open land.  The 
building is located off the base in order to provide barrier free access to visiting 
collaborators. 
The laboratory building is a one-story building with mechanical penthouses consisting of 
97,000 square feet of offices, conference rooms, laboratories, and building services.  
The building houses numerous research efforts pertaining to nanoscale science 
research.  In order to support these research efforts, the building also contains a 
cleanroom and a chemical stockroom.  The facility is fully sprinklered per the IBC and 
NFPA 13 Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems, 2002 Ed. 
The building’s construction type is classified as a Type II-B per the IBC Table 601.  IBC 
Type II-B is equivalent to NFPA Type II(000) per LSC Commentary Table 8.1 and the 
provision for equivalency in LSC Section 1.4.  This construction type is considered 
“noncombustible, unprotected”, therefore noncombustible materials are used and no 
building elements require a fire resistance rating.   
Figure 1 gives a basic floor plan of the laboratory building which will be used throughout 
the report. 
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Figure 1 - Floor Plan 
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 LIFE SAFETY ANALYSIS 4.0
4.1 Introduction to Prescriptive-Based Analysis 
The following analysis is performed using the LSC and the IBC.  A prescriptive-based 
analysis compares the building to the applicable codes and standards and provides a 
better understanding of where codes are met and not met within the building.  The 
prescriptive-based analysis does not account for occupant characteristics as well as 
proposed uses for specific rooms.  This analysis typically considers the worst case 
scenarios in order to ensure all future uses of the building will meet the code.  Sandia 
uses both the IBC and the LSC.  Both codes will be compared to the building, and the 
more stringent code will be applied to the building. 
4.2 Occupancy Classifications 
The laboratory building is a multiple occupancy building which meets the provisions of a 
separated occupancy per LSC 6.1.14.4 and IBC 508.4.  Table 1 compares the 
occupancy classification for the laboratory building per the IBC to the occupancy 
classification per the LSC: 
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Table 1 - Occupancy Classifications 
4.3 Occupant Loads 
A comparison of occupant load factors from the IBC and the LSC can be found in Table 
2 below.  The occupant load factors are in terms of floor area in square feet per 
occupant (ft2/person).  Their values are taken from IBC Table 1004.1.2 and LSC Table 
7.3.1.2. 
Types of Rooms LSC Classifications 
(Chapter 6.1) 
IBC Classifications 
(Chapter 3) 
Office Spaces Business B 
Meeting Spaces (< 50) Business B 
Laboratory Spaces Industrial – General B 
Service Spaces Business B 
Mechanical Rooms 
(Penthouse) 
Industrial – General B 
Assembly Space Assembly A-3 
Main Mechanical Room Industrial – General F-1 
Main Electrical Room Industrial – General F-1 
Boiler Room Industrial – General F-1 
DI water equipment room Industrial – General F-1 
Loading Dock Area Industrial – General F-1 
Janitors Office Area Industrial – General F-1 
Chemical Stockroom Industrial – High Hazard H-3 
Cleanroom Spaces Industrial – High Hazard H-5 
Mechanical Room (directly 
above cleanroom) 
Industrial – High Hazard H-5 
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Table 2 - Occupant Load Factor 
Use LSC Load Factor 
(ft2/person) 
IBC Load Factor 
(ft2/person) 
Assembly 15 net 15 net 
Business 100 100 
General and High Hazard 
Industrial 
100 - 
Group H-5 - 200 
Storage 500 300 
Mechanical Rooms*  300 
*The mechanical rooms will be “General and High Hazard Use” for the LSC Load Factor 
An occupant load was not calculated for the penthouses on the roof because they are 
not occupiable spaces per LSC 3.3.268.1. 
Based on Table 1 and Table 2, it is clear that the IBC offers more specific occupancy 
classification for the laboratory building while keeping similar load factor requirements 
as the LSC.  Storage use is the only major difference between the two load factors.  
LSC sets its storage load factor at 500 𝑓𝑡2/𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 while IBC’s is at 300.  This is not a 
major concern because the largest storage room in the laboratory building is less than 
500.  Given the appropriateness of the IBC, the occupant loads will be conducted per 
the IBC. 
The room-by-room occupant load calculation can be found in Appendix B: Occupant 
Loads.  In this appendix, the building was divided into 13 sections for ease of calculating 
occupant load and egress capacity.  Sections 11 and 12 are the north and south 
courtyards respectively.  The occupant load for each section of the building is shown in 
the following table. 
Table 3 - Occupant Load by Building Section 
Section 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 TOTAL 
Occupant Load 18 45 18 27 32 65 76 65 75 134 124 213 80 972 
 
The following table offers a breakdown of occupant loads by use: 
   16 
 
Table 4 - Occupant Load by Use 
Use Factor (ft2/person) Load 
Assembly 15 net 627 
Business 100 298 
Group H-5 200 27 
Storage 300 2 
Mechanical 300 18 
TOTAL  972 
 
4.4 Building Exits 
The following section examines the number of exits required by code, the location of the 
exits, and the location of the exit signs.   
 Number of Exits 4.4.1
The IBC 1021.2.1 and LSC 7.4.1.2(1) require 3 exits for a floor with an occupant load 
between 501 and 1000 occupants.  The laboratory building has 5 main exits and 
complies with the code.  IBC 1021.2.1 requires mixed occupancies to have separate 
exits or access to exits for each occupancy classification according to IBC Table 
1021.2(2).  All occupancies have their own separate exits to the outside except for the 
A-3 occupancy; however, the A-3 occupancy has access to two or more exits on the 
same floor without having to cross through intervening spaces.  The F-1 occupancy has 
numerous rooms with 1 exit; however, these rooms are separated and meet the 
maximum required occupants for one exit per IBC Table 1021.2(2).  The LSC 40.2.4.1.2 
permits Industrial – General occupancies to have a single means of egress.  The 
laboratory building meets the number of exit requirements provided by the LSC and 
IBC.  There are 3 stairways within the building which are used for roof access only and 
will be ignored for this report since they do not play a role in the means of egress a one 
story building.  The following table summarizes the number of exits required by IBC 
1021. 
Table 5 - Required Exits (IBC 1021) 
Occupant Load Exits 
IBC Table 1021.2(2) 1 
1-500 2 
501-1000 3 
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 Arrangement of Exits 4.4.2
The laboratory building is a sprinklered building, therefore, LSC 7.5.1.3.3 requires the 
separation distance between 2 remote exits to be 1/3 the diagonal of the building.  The 
diagonal of the building is approximately 430 feet.  The minimum separation distance for 
exits is 144 ft.  The closest exits are located 167 feet from each other.  IBC 1015.2.1 
has the same requirements as LSC 7.5.1.3.3.  The location of the exits is shown on the 
figure in Appendix A: Exits and Exit Signs.  The laboratory building contains equipment 
room door open which open from one side of a fire rated wall into a main corridor.  LSC 
A.7.1.3.2(9)(c) permits the opening of equipment rooms into corridors provided that: 1) 
the space is used solely for non-fuel-fired mechanical equipment; 2) the space contains 
no storage of combustible materials; 3) the building protected with an automatic 
sprinkler system.  When the movable partition wall are in place in the A-3 assembly 
occupancy, the north room will have an occupant load greater than 50 persons and 
would require 2 exits.  The second exit from the north assembly room is into the north 
courtyard.  “NO EXIT” signs would need to be placed on the exterior of these doors to 
notify occupants on the courtyard not to exit through the north assembly room.  The 
laboratory building meets the exit arrangement requirements of the IBC and LSC.   
 Exit Sign Locations 4.4.3
The exit sign plan is located on the figure in Appendix A: Exits and Exit Signs.  The 
location of the exit signs were chosen based on LSC 7.10.1.2.1, LSC 7.10.1.2.2, and 
IBC 1011.1.  Exit signs are spaced no more than 100 feet apart. 
4.5 Egress Capacity 
All egress components in the building are doors.  The following calculations compare 
the LSC “Egress Capacity” to the IBC “Means of Egress Sizing”.  Egress capacity is 
calculated using the capacity factors from LSC Table 7.3.3.1.  “Means of Egress Sizing” 
is taken from IBC 1005.3.2 and 1008.1.1.  All assumed clear widths of single doors and 
double doors in the laboratory building are 34” and 64” respectively.  The assembly 
occupancies in the laboratory building have doors which meet the LSC 13.2.3.6.2 
requirement for assembly occupancies to have a main entrance which can 
accommodate one-half the total occupant load.  The courtyards don’t have an obvious 
main entrance/exit required by LSC 13.2.3.6.1, however, LSC 13.2.3.7.4 permit the lack 
of a well-defined main entrance/exit as long as the other exits are evenly distributed 
along the perimeter. 
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Table 6 - LSC Egress Capacity 
Section OL No. of 
Exits 
Component Clear Width 
(in) 
Capacity 
Factor 
(in/person) 
Capacity 
(people) 
Compliant 
1 18 2 Door 34 0.2 340 Y 
2 45 2 Door 34 0.2 340 Y 
3 18 2 Door 34 0.2 340 Y 
4 27 2 Door 34 0.2 340 Y 
5 32 1 Door 34 0.2 170 Y 
6 65 2 Door 64 0.2 640 Y 
7 76 4 Door 34 0.2 680 Y 
8 65 2 Door 64 0.2 640 Y 
9 75 4 Door 34 0.2 680 Y 
10 111 3 Door 34 0.2 510 Y 
11 124 2 Door 34 0.2 340 Y 
12 213 3 Door 34 0.2 510 Y 
Building 972 5 Door 64 0.2 1600 Y 
 
 
Table 7 - IBC Means of Egress Sizing 
Section OL No. 
of 
Exits 
Element Clear 
Width 
(in) 
Width 
Factor 
(in/person) 
Calculated 
Width (in) 
Min. 
Width 
(in) 
Most 
Stringent 
Compliant 
1 18 2 Door 34 0.15 1.35 32 32 Y 
2 45 2 Door 34 0.15 3.375 32 32 Y 
3 18 2 Door 34 0.15 1.35 32 32 Y 
4 27 2 Door 34 0.2 2.7 32 32 Y 
5 32 1 Door 34 0.2 6.4 32 32 Y 
6 65 2 Door 64 0.15 4.875 32 32 Y 
7 76 4 Door 34 0.15 2.85 32 32 Y 
8 65 2 Door 64 0.15 4.875 32 32 Y 
9 75 4 Door 34 0.15 2.8125 32 32 Y 
10 111 3 Door 34 0.15 5.55 32 32 Y 
11 124 2 Door 34 0.15 9.3 32 32 Y 
12 213 3 Door 34 0.15 10.65 32 32 Y 
Building 972 5 Door 64 0.15 29.16 32 32 Y 
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In the tables above, the occupant load of section 11 has been reduced to only account 
for the rooms which have partition walls which can be combined into one large 
assembly room.  The occupant load of the entire building is a conservative estimate.  In 
reality, the entire populations would not use 1 of the 5 major exits since many sections 
have their own exits to the exterior.  Section 13 was not included in this calculation 
since it is composed of individual rooms which all have relatively small occupant loads 
and meet egress capacity requirements.  All exits are evenly balanced within each 
section and the building as a whole in order to meet IBC 1005.5 and LSC 7.3.1.1.2 
which requires the loss of one exit to not consume more than 50 percent of the egress 
capacity.  Section 5 is broken up into many smaller sections by 1 and 2 hour fire 
barriers.  In order to make a conservative calculation, the cumulative occupant load of 
section 5 was assumed to exit out of 1 door.  Section 5 was compliant with the 
assumption; therefore, compliance will be maintained with the addition of more exit 
doors. 
4.6 Travel Distance 
The following table for travel distance requirements is taken from IBC Table 1016.2 and 
LSC Table A.7.6.  All distance values are for an existing, sprinklered building. 
Table 8 - Travel Distance (feet) 
Occupancy LSC IBC Actual 
Business/B 300 300 192 
Assembly/A-3 250 250 142 
Industrial (General)/F-1 250 250 103 
Industrial (High)/H-3 75 150 47 
Industrial (High)/H-5 75 200 70 
 
The 2 codes are almost identical except when we get into the high hazard occupancies.  
The LSC Industrial – High Hazard occupancy has a more stringent travel distance.  The 
drawing in Appendix C: Travel Distance depicts some “worst case scenario” travel 
distances for each of the occupancies.  Travel distances were calculated from the 
furthest point within an occupancy to the nearest exit.  All travel distances in the 
laboratory building comply with both the IBC and the LSC.  The H-5 occupancy is able 
to meet the travel distance due to the horizontal exit which encompasses the area. 
4.7 Horizontal Exits 
The laboratory building is separated into numerous control areas by fire barriers.  
Building elements such as wall and doors are assigned a fire resistance rating in 
accordance with American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E 119.  For a wall, 
the transmission of heat shall not raise the temperature on the unexposed surface more 
than 250oF (139oC) above its initial temperature.  The passage of flame or gases shall 
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not be hot enough to ignite cotton waste on the unexposed side.  The wall shall also be 
able to withstand the hose stream test without the passage of water.  Fire barriers are 
permitted to separate the building into control areas to meet the maximum allowable 
quantities for hazardous material specified in IBC 414.2.1.  Fire barriers separating 
occupancies within a building, with a 2-hour rating, can serve as a horizontal exit per 
IBC 707.3.10; 1025.2; therefore, occupants in the H-5 occupants meet the required 
travel distance once they cross the 2-hour fire barrier shown in Appendix D: Fire 
Resistance Ratings. 
4.8 Fire Resistance Ratings 
See Appendix D for a floor plan of the fire rated walls.  The laboratory building met older 
editions of the IBC which required a 4 hour separation between an H-5 occupancy and 
an Assembly occupancy.  The H-5 already had a 2 hour separations around it, so a 2 
hour wall was built around the assembly occupancy in order to meet the 4 hour 
requirement.  Table 9 pulls required separation values from the IBC 508.4 for a 
sprinklered building. 
Table 9 – Required Separation (IBC 508.4) 
Use A-3 B F-1 H-3 H-5 
A-3  1 2 3 4 
B   2 1 1 
F-1    1 1 
H-3     1 
 
The LSC has a similar table found in LSC Table 6.1.14.4.1: 
Table 10 - LSC Occupancy Sepatation 
Occupancy Occupancy Separation (hours) 
Industrial – High Hazard Assembly < 300 3 
Industrial – High Hazard Business 2 
Industrial – High Hazard Industrial – General 1 
Business Assembly < 300 1 
Industrial – General Assembly < 300 2 
 
IBC 1018.1 requires the corridors to be shielded from H-3 and H-5 occupancies by a 1 
hour fire rated wall.  LSC 7.1.3.1 requires a corridor serving an occupant load greater 
than 30 to be 1-hour rated, however, this doesn’t apply to an existing building provided 
that the occupancy classification doesn’t change.  .  The corridors are shielded from the 
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H-3 and H-5 occupancy by a 2 hour fire rated wall.  The laboratory building surpasses 
the IBC and LSC requirements for fire resistance ratings. 
4.9 Interior Finish Requirements 
The following table from the IBC is used to determine allowable finished for walls, 
ceiling, and floors based on the occupancy classification: 
Table 11 - Interior Finish Classes (IBC 803.1.1; 804.2) 
Group Wall and Ceiling Class Floor Class 
 Corridor Room  
B C C II 
A-3 B C II 
F-1 C C II 
H-3 B C II 
H-5 B C II 
  
The wall and ceiling classes are tested under ASTM E 84 “Standard Test Method for 
Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials” and given a flame spread index 
and a smoke developed index.  The following table identifies the three classes per 
ASTM E 84: 
Table 12 - Wall/Ceiling Finish Index (IBC 803.1.1; ASTM E 84) 
Class Flame Spread Smoke Developed 
A 0-25 0-450 
B 26-75 0-450 
C 76-200 0-450 
 
The floor classes are determined in tested under NFPA 253 to determine the minimum 
critical radiant flux to prevent flame spread along the floor: 
Table 13 - Floor Finish (IBC 804.2; NFPA 253) 
Class Minimum Critical 
Radiant Flux 
I 0.45 W/cm2 
II 0.22 W/cm2 
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All materials in the laboratory building are required to meet the Department of Energy 
(DOE) Standard, DOE Std 1066-99, which limits the flame spread to less than 25 and 
the smoke developed index to less than 50.  These requirements are more stringent 
than those required by IBC Table 803.9 and LSC Table A.10.2.2; therefore, the 
laboratory building meets the code based on its need to follow a more stringent DOE 
standard.  Lastly, IBC 806.1.2 limits the amount of combustible decorative material to 10 
percent of the wall area.  
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 WATER-BASED FIRE SUPPRESSION 5.0
5.1 Automatic Sprinkler System Introduction 
The laboratory building is protected throughout by two electrically supervised, fully 
automatic, wet-pipe, hydraulically calculated sprinkler systems.  The laboratory is a 
single story building with mechanical penthouses located on top of the building.  The 
approximate area of the first floor is 82,500 sq. ft. which requires the laboratory building 
to have two separate automatic sprinkler systems in order to keep the operating area of 
each system less than 52,000 sq. ft. required by NFPA 13-2013 Sect. 8.2.1.  As a 
Department of Energy (DOE) Facility, the laboratory building is required to meet the 
DOE Standard DOE-STD-1066-99 Fire Protection Design Criteria in addition to the IBC 
and applicable NFPA standards.  As a Sandia facility, the laboratory building is also 
required to follow Sandia Specification Section 15310 Automatic Sprinklers and Water-
Based Fire Protection Systems. 
5.2 Water Supply 
 Water Supply Characteristics 5.2.1
Sandia National Laboratories is located on Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico.  Sandia connects to the KAFB water main to provide 
required water flow and water pressure for the automatic sprinkler system and manual 
firefighting operations.  The fire loop contains fire hydrants spaced a maximum of 300 
feet apart.  The hydrants are located between 40 and 100 feet from the building.  At 
least one hydrant is located within 150 feet of the FDC 
 Water Flow Test 5.2.2
A water flow test was conducted on February 28, 2007 which resulted in the following 
data: 
Table 14 - Water Flow Test 
Category Value 
Static Pressure 74 psi 
Residual Pressure 52 psi 
Water Flow 1451 gpm 
 
The results of the water flow test are graphed in Appendix I: Flow Test Summary Sheet. 
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5.3 Sprinkler System Design Criteria 
 Occupancy Classification 5.3.1
Table 15 depicts the sprinkler system occupancy classifications of the various areas of 
the building under NFPA 13.  The Sandia construction specification for automatic 
sprinklers, Sandia Spec. 15310-2012, has more stringent requirements.  
Table 15 - NFPA 13 Occupancy Classification 
Space Occupancy Classification Reference 
Offices Light Hazard NFPA 13, 5.2 
Laboratories Ordinary Hazard (Class C 
Laboratory) 
NFPA 13, 22.8.1 (2) 
NFPA 45, 6.2.1.1 
Cleanrooms Special Hazard NFPA 13, 22.23 
Flammable Liquid Storage Extra Hazard  Group 2 
Special Hazard 
 
Special Hazard 
NFPA 13, 5.4.2 
NFPA 13, 22.2 
NFPA 30, 16.5.2 
IFC 5704.3.6.3 
Exterior Loading Dock Special Hazard NFPA 13, 22.8.1 (2) 
NFPA 45, 6.2.1.1 
Shops and Equipment 
Rooms 
Ordinary Hazard Group 2 NFPA 30, 5.3.2 
 
All spaces are easily classifiable by NFPA 13 except for the flammable liquid storage.  
The first classification of flammable liquid storage comes from NFPA 13, 5.4.2 which 
classifies extra hazard group 2 as an occupancy containing moderate to substantial 
amount of flammable or combustible liquids.  The second classification comes from 
NFPA 13, 22.2 which considers flammable liquid storages as a special hazard and 
redirects you to use NFPA 30.  NFPA 30, 16.5.2 contains 7 different design tables 
depending on the quantity of liquid, size of container, type or rack, etc.  Additionally, 
these design tables are broken down further into 3 different design schemes, which are 
separated even further into their own design tables.  The third classification comes from 
the IFC 5704.3.6.3 which contains 8 sprinkler design tables depending on the storage 
layout.  Due to a limited knowledge of the actual flammable liquid storage room layout, 
container types, and quantities, we use the extra hazard group 2 design criteria. 
 Sprinkler System Design Criteria 5.3.2
We will now compare the NFPA 13 sprinkler design criteria to the Sandia Spec. 15310-
2012 criteria.  The NFPA 13 criteria were taken from the Density/Area Curves found in 
NFPA 13 Figure 11.2.3.1.1: 
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Table 16 - Sprinkler Desigin Criteria (NFPA 13 vs. Sandia Spec. 15310-2012) 
Space Classification 
(NFPA 13) 
Density 
(gpm/ft2) 
Area (ft2) Hose (gpm) Duration 
(min) 
  NFPA 
13 
Sandia 
15310 
NFPA 
13 
Sandia 
15310 
NFPA 
13 
Sandia 
15310 
NFPA 13 
Office LH 0.10 0.15 1500 1500 100 500 30 
Lab Class C OH1 0.15 0.17 1500 3000 250 500 60-90 
Cleanroom SH 0.20 0.20 3000 3000 - 500 - 
FLS EH2 0.40 - 2500 - 500 - 90-120 
 
Table 17 extracts the most stringent sprinkler design criteria from Table 16 above: 
Table 17 - Sprinkler System Design Criteria (2012) 
Space Density 
(
𝒈𝒑𝒎
𝒇𝒕𝟐
) 
Area 
(𝒇𝒕𝟐) 
Hose Stream 
(𝒈𝒑𝒎) 
Duration 
(𝒎𝒊𝒏) 
Offices 0.15 1500 500 60 
Laboratories 0.17 3000 500 60 
Cleanrooms 0.20 3000 500 90 
Flammable 
Liquid 
Storage 
0.40 2500 500 90 
 
At the time the building was constructed, the sprinkler designer used Sandia Spec. 
15310-2001.  The following table indicates the design criteria used by the contractor.  
This will be the design criteria we will use for the hydraulic calculations in order to 
compare our results to the contractor’s results: 
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Table 18 - Sprinkler System Design Criteria (Contractor's Values - 2001) 
Space Density 
(
𝒈𝒑𝒎
𝒇𝒕𝟐
) 
Area 
(𝒇𝒕𝟐) 
Hose Stream 
(𝒈𝒑𝒎) 
Duration 
(𝒎𝒊𝒏) 
Offices 0.17 3000 500 60 
Laboratories 0.20 3000 500 60 
Cleanrooms 0.20 3000 500 90 
Flammable 
Liquid 
Storage 
0.60 Entire 
Storage 
500 120 
Other areas 0.17 3000 500 60 
 
A map portraying the most remote areas based on the design criteria above can be 
found in Appendix H: Hydraulic Calculations, Figure 53. 
5.4 Sprinkler System Location and Size 
 Location and Size of Piping 5.4.1
A 10-inch domestic water line connects the KAFB system to the 8-inch looped main 
which encompasses the laboratory building.  A diagram of the 8-inch looped main is 
located in Appendix F: Automatic Sprinkler System.  The 8-inch looped main contains 
sectional valves.  The main enters the building at the west end where the line splits into 
two sprinkler risers.  Sandia Spec 15310 Sect. 2.06 (A)(1) requires Schedule 10 pipe to 
be used for all diameters greater than or equal to 2-1/2 inches and schedule 40 to be 
used for diameters less than 2-1/2 inches. 
The two risers divide the building in a northern and southern sprinkler coverage zone.  
The risers are cross connected by a normally closed valve.  Each riser has its own fire 
department connection (FDC) at the lead-in on the west end of the building.  Due to fire 
department response approaching from the east side of the building, an additional FDC 
is located near the main entrance on the east side of the building and ties into a bulk 
main near the entrance of the building.  The FDCs are installed per NFPA 13 Section 
6.8.1.  A reduced pressure backflow preventer is located in the mechanical room just 
before the two risers per NFPA 13, 24.1.8. 
 Standpipe 5.4.2
Two standpipes run along the east corridor and two run along the west corridor.  Sandia 
Spec. 15310, Sect. 1.04 (B)(6)I requires Class 1 standpipes where shown on the 
drawings.  The two standpipes in the laboratory building have a diameter of 1-1/2 
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inches.  The standpipes are accessible from the corridors.  A fire hydrant must be 
located within 100 feet of the standpipe FDC per IFC 2012, 507.5.1.1  
 Waterflow Alarm (NFPA 13, 6.9) 5.4.3
The sprinkler system is supervised by a tamper switch on all sprinkler control valves as 
well as a vane type water flow indicator for each riser. 
 Backflow Preventers 5.4.4
The IFC 9.3.3.5 requires potable water supplies to be protected against backflow in 
accordance with IFC 9.3.3.5.1 and the International Plumbing Code.  The backflow 
preventer assembly consists of two 8-inch FEBCO Model 860 reduced pressure 
backflow preventers with an incoming and outgoing Outside Screw and Yoke (OS&Y) 
valve and tamper switch.   
 Inspector’s Test Valve (NFPA 13, 6.7.3) 5.4.5
One inspector’s test valve is located on the east end of the building at the main 
entrance.  The other test valve is located at the NW exit of the building. 
 Fire Department Connection 5.4.6
The two FDCs located on the west end of the building are located behind a security 
fence.  IFC 912.3 requires access to the FDC to be free of obstructions such as fences 
except when the fence is provided with proper signs and equipped with a means of 
emergency operation.  The FDC located on the east end of the building is near the main 
entrance.  The east FDC is located behind a decorative wall of the main entrance which 
poses a visibility issues from the street.  IFC 912.2.1 requires FDC to be clearly visible 
from the street side of buildings and fully visible from the nearest point of fire 
department vehicle access. 
 Type of Sprinklers 5.4.7
All sprinkler heads in the laboratory building are listed according to NFPA 13, 6.1.  The 
sprinklers will be ½ inch orifice, upright or pendant, standard response, ordinary 
temperature 155oF, K-5.6 sprinklers per Sandia Spec. Table 1 except the cleanrooms 
and the chemical storage.  The cleanrooms will use quick response sprinklers.  The 
chemical storage will use K-11.2 sprinklers per NFPA 30-2012 Table 16.5.2.2.  Ordinary 
temperature heads are installed in the chemical storage when most tables in NFPA 30-
2013 16.5.2 require high temperature heads.  Sandia Spec 15310 requires the use of 
flex sprinkler heads for use with dropped ceilings.  The automatic sprinkler system in the 
laboratory building is equipped with schedule 10 sprinkler pipe for diameters of 2.5 
inches and larger and schedule 40 for diameters less than 2.5 inches.  The lab area 
contains sprinklers above and below the ceiling.  The cleanroom area uses Flex Head 
sprinkler connections.  See Appendix G: Sprinkler Head Detail for details on the 
sprinkler heads used in the laboratory building. 
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5.5 Hydraulic Calculations 
NFPA 13 Chapter 23 was referenced while performing hydraulic calculations. 
 Hydraulic Hand Calculations 5.5.1
For this example, we will hydraulically calculate the northern most ordinary hazard area 
from Appendix H: Hydraulic Calculations, Figure 53 with a density of 0.17 𝑔𝑝𝑚/𝑓𝑡2 and 
a design area of 3000 𝑓𝑡2.  A more detailed image of this area can be seen in Figure 
54.  The hydraulic calculation performed manually using Microsoft Excel and it can be 
found in Table 61.  Additionally, Table 62 to Table 66 are pressure balances that are 
used are various nodes during the hydraulic calculation process.  Table 61 depicts a 
flow and pressure at the base of the riser (BOR) of 725 𝑔𝑝𝑚 and 68.1 𝑝𝑠𝑖 respectively.  
These values are relatively close to the computer calculated values reported by the 
designer of 755.46 𝑔𝑝𝑚 and 59.55 𝑝𝑠𝑖. 
Performing the hydraulic calculations proved to be a challenge because of the lack of 
symmetry in the sprinkler system.  This lack of symmetry required a separate branch 
equivalent K-factor for each branch line.  The irregular layout also made pressure 
balancing at the nodes more difficult.  A major assumption made on the Excel sheet 
was the use of an average S and L value in order to calculate the protection coverage 
area per NFPA 13-2013 Sect. 8.5.2: 
𝐴𝑠 = 𝑆 × 𝐿 
The values of S and L were assumed to be 10 ft. and 8.5 ft. respectively by examining 
the drawing. 
 Water Demand 5.5.2
The flow test summary sheet can be found in Appendix I: Flow Test Summary Sheet, 
Figure 55.  The sheet compares the water supply to the sprinkler and hose stream 
demand.  Sandia Spec requires an 85 percent limit on the supply curve which is shown 
on the summary sheet.  The manually calculated sprinkler demand from “Appendix H: 
Hydraulic Calculations” exceed the 85 percent supply limit; therefore, the supply is not 
adequate.  The designer’s demand calculations meet the 85 percent supply limit, prior 
to adding the hose stream allowance.  After the hose steam allowance is added to the 
sprinkler demand, the designed calculations exceed the 85 percent supply curve as 
well. 
5.6 Inspection Testing and Maintenance (ITM) 
The IFC 901.6.1 requires the Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of a water-based 
fire protection system to follow NFPA 25.  Below is a list compiling inspection, testing, 
and maintenance requirements for major sprinkler system components installed in the 
laboratory building.  Sprinkler system requirements are taken from NFPA 25-2014 Table 
5.1.1.2, standpipe requirements come from Table 6.1.2, and valve/trim requirements 
from Table 13.1.1.2. 
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Table 19 - ITM Requirements 
Component Inspect Test Maintenance 
Waterflow alarm 
devices 
Quarterly to verify 
they are free of 
physical damage 
(5.2.5) 
Semiannually 
(5.3.3.2) 
 
Valve Supervisory 
signal devices 
Quarterly to verify 
they are free of 
physical damage 
(5.2.5) 
Quarterly to verify 
they are free of 
physical damage 
(13.3.2.1.2) 
 
Gauges Quarterly to ensure 
normal water supply 
pressure (5.2.4.1) 
5 years (5.3.2) 
(13.2.7.2) 
 
Hydraulic 
Nameplate 
Quarterly (5.2.6)   
Hanger/seismic 
bracing 
Annually from floor 
level (5.2.3) 
  
Pipe and fittings Annually from floor 
level (5.2.2) 
  
Sprinklers Annually from floor 
level (5.2.1) 
Annually inspect 
spares (5.2.1.4) 
At 50 years and 
every 10 years 
thereafter 
(5.3.1.1.1) 
Fast-response at 20 
years and every 10 
years thereafter 
(5.3.1.1.1.3) 
 
 
Antifreeze Solution  Annually before the 
onset of freezing 
weather (5.3.4) 
 
Piping (Standpipe) Visually inspected 
annually (6.2.1) 
  
Gauges (Standpipe) Quarterly to ensure 
normal water supply 
pressure (6.2.2) 
  
Hydraulic Design 
Information 
(Standpipe) 
Annually (6.2.3)   
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Hydrostatic Test 
(Standpipe) 
 5 years (6.3.2)  
Flow Test 
(Standpipe) 
 5 years (6.3.1)  
Hose Connections 
(Standpipe) 
  Annually (Table 
6.1.2) 
Control Valves Sealed weekly 
(13.3.2.1) 
Locked for 
electrically 
supervised monthly 
(13.3.2.1.1) 
 
Check position and 
operation annually 
(13.3.3.1) 
Supervisory 
(13.3.3.5) 
Annually (13.3.4) 
Check Valves 5 years (13.4.2.1)   
Backflow preventer Weekly/monthly 
(13.6.1) 
Annually (13.6.2)  
Main drains  Annually for each 
water supply lead-in 
(13.2.5) (13.2.5.1) 
Any time the control 
valve is closed and 
reopened at system 
riser (13.3.3.4) 
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 FIRE ALARM SYSTEM 6.0
6.1 Fire Alarm Characteristics 
The laboratory building is monitored by a proprietary supervising station.  The station is 
located on KAFB and monitors all of SNL Albuquerque location.  The station utilizes a 
Digital Alarm Communicator Receiver (DACR) to receive alarms from Digital Alarm 
Communicator Transmitters (DACT) located in the fire alarm control panel (FACP).  The 
laboratory building is located just outside the gates of Kirtland AFB; therefore, a quick 
detection time is imperative to give the fire department enough time to respond to a fire. 
The FACP is an Edwards Signaling Technology (EST) QuickStart (QS4) Intelligent 
Control Panel.  The panel can support up to 1,000 intelligent detectors and modules 
along with 48 conventional class B or 40 Class A/B initiating device circuits (IDC). 
One discrepancy with the fire alarm drawings furnished by the contractor is the location 
of the FACP.  The “Fire Alarm Riser Diagram” states that the FACP is located in the 
lobby; however, the “Fire Alarm As-Built” correctly shows the FACP located in an 
administrative room on the southwest region of the building.  See Appendix J: Fire 
Alarm System, Figure 56 for the FACP location. 
The fire alarm system is broken up into zones each with their own Fire Alarm Terminal 
Cabinet (FATC).  The FATCs act as a gathering point for all circuits within the zone.  
The as-builts incorrectly list FATC’s as “Not Applicable” and does not show the FATC’s 
on the drawings. 
6.2 Fire Detection Devices 
Fire detection devices on a Signaling Line Circuit (SLC) or IDC shall be an NFPA 72 
Class A circuit per Sandia Spec. 13852 Sect. 1.06.  According to NFPA 72, 12.3.1, a 
Class A pathway includes a redundant path, continues to operate past a single open or 
a single ground fault, and conditions that affect the intended path result in a trouble 
signal. 
The laboratory building contains various forms of fire detection throughout the building.  
There is no smoke detection required throughout the entire building per IBC 907.2 and 
NFPA 72, 17.5.3.2.  Smoke/Duct detectors exist to specific areas to activate a fire alarm 
safety function per IBC 907.3.  These fire alarm safety functions include controlling door 
releases, shutting down the HVAC, shutting down toxic gas panel.  Smoke detectors are 
also located to protect the FACP and FATCs per IBC 907.4.1 and NFPA 72, 10.4.4.  
Duct detectors are located in the supply and return air ducts, and vane-type water flow 
detectors are located on the sprinkler risers. Heat detectors or specialty harsh 
environment smoke detectors are used instead of the photoelectric smoke detectors in 
areas that are smoky, dusty, humid, or have extreme temperatures.  A High-Sensitivity 
Smoke Detection (HSSD) system is also located in the clean room areas.  Manual pull 
stations are located every 400 feet in the corridor, and every 150 feet along the 
chemical transport route per IBC 415.10.2.  Manual pull stations are located near every 
exit of the building even though IBC 907.2 only requires a minimum of one pull station.  
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The pull stations are located within 5 feet of every exit per IBC 907.4.2.1.  There are two 
additional pull stations located in the south corridor of the southern region due to the 
requirements for an H-occupancy per IBC 907.2.5.  Manual pull stations are installed 
42-48 inches above the finished floor per IBC 907.4.2.2.  Below is a table of fire alarm 
equipment installed in the laboratory building: 
Table 20 - Fire Alarm Equipment 
Equipment Make Model Location 
FACP EST QS4-12-R-1 Room 1936 
Annunciator EST QSA-1-F Lobby 
Manual Pull Station EST SIGA-278 Along exit 
pathways; near exit 
door 
Intelligent Duct 
Detector 
EST SIGA-SD Throughout Building 
Intelligent Heat 
Detector 
EST SIGA-HRS  
Intelligent 
Photoelectric 
Smoke Detector 
EST SIGA-PS Throughout Building 
Multitone 
Horn/Strobe 
Wheelock MT-2475W-FR Occupiable Spaces 
Multitone 
Horn/Strobe 
Weatherproof 
Wheelock MTWP-2475W-FR Outside exterior 
walls 
Booster Power 
Supply 
Wheelock PS1224-8MP Throughout Building 
Multi-Candela 
Strobe 
Wheelock RSS-24MCW-FR Occupiable Spaces 
Sync Module Wheelock SM-24-R  
Surge Suppressor Edco FAS-120AC  
Battery (7 Amp 
Hour) 
YUASA NP7-12  
14/2 NAC Cable CSC 250017 Throughout Building 
16/2 SLIC Data 
Cable 
CSC 250039 Throughout Building 
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6.3 Location, Spacing, and Placement – Detection Devices 
The location and spacing drawings of the fire alarm system can be found in Appendix K: 
Fire Alarm System Location and Spacing.  The laboratory building is not a continuously 
occupied building (24 hours per day, 7 days per week, 365 days per year). 
6.4 Alarm, Supervisory, and Trouble Signals 
In general, NFPA 72, 26.3.8.1.1 requires the following to result in an alarm signal: 
Manual fire alarm boxes 
Automatic fire detectors 
Waterflow from the automatic sprinkler system 
Actuation of other fire suppression systems or equipment 
More specifically, Sandia Spec. 13852 Sect. 1.06 D lists the following as initiators for an 
alarm signal: 
Manual pull stations 
Heat detectors 
Photoelectric smoke detectors 
Automatic sprinkler system water flow detection switches 
Automatic sprinkler system pressure switches 
Air sampling control panels 
Fire suppression release panels 
UV/IR detectors 
Hazard monitoring inputs 
The figure below shows the alarm system outputs for various signals received by the 
FACP: 
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Figure 2 - Fire Alarm System Functional Matrix 
All alarm signals from the functional matrix above result in transmitting the alarm to the 
proprietary station.  The proprietary station performs the proper signal disposition 
procedures per NFPA 72, 26.4.6.6. 
6.5 Alarm Notification Devices 
See Table 20 for a list of notification devices.   
The cut sheets from the Wheelock Multitone Horn/Strobe MT-2475W-FR can be found 
in Appendix L: Wheelock Horn/Strobe.  The horn/strobe operates at 24 VDC.  The horn 
RMS current is 0.074 Amps when the horn is operating at 92 dBA.  When the strobe is 
operating at 75 cd, the RMS current is 0.060 Amps.  These values will be used in 
Section 6.7 when calculating power requirements for the secondary power supply.  All 
specifications were taken from the Cooper Industries website. 
6.6 Location, Spacing, and Placement – Notification Devices 
NFPA 72 Table A.18.4.3 states average ambient sound levels for various occupancies.  
The laboratory building will primarily fall under the business occupancy with an average 
ambient sound level of 55 decibels A-weighted (dBA).  The mechanical rooms 
throughout the building will have an assumed sound level of 85 dBA.  The total sound 
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pressure level (SPL) can’t exceed 110 dBA per NFPA 72, 18.4.3.1 and the notification 
appliance (NA) must have a SPL at least 15 dBA above ambient per NFPA 72, 18.4.3.1.  
This means the mechanical rooms must have a horn with a SPL of 100 dBA (85 𝑑𝐵𝐴 +
15 𝑑𝐵𝐴), and the rest of the building must have a horn SPL of 70 dBA (55 𝑑𝐵𝐴 +
15 𝑑𝐵𝐴). 
The Wheelock MT Multitone Horn/Strobes has a maximum SPL of 92 dBA at 10 feet.  
The following table utilizes the “6 dBA Rule” found in the NFPA Handbook Sect. 14-3 to 
calculate the SPL as you move further away from the horn: 
Table 21 - Sound Pressure (6 dBA Rule) 
Sound Pressure (dBA) Distance from Source (ft.) 
92 10 
86 20 
80 40 
74 80 
68 160 
 
The table above tells us that you can move almost 160 away from a horn before the 
SPL drops below the minimum required of 70 dBA.  The fire alarm drawings shown in 
Appendix K: Fire Alarm System Location and Spacing clearly show all areas in the 
building (excluding mechanical rooms) area located within 160 feet of a horn.  The 
laboratory building (excluding mechanical rooms) meets the minimum horn SPL criteria 
required by NFPA 72.  The mechanical rooms on the other hand can have an ambient 
SPL in the 90’s.  The current horns used are not capable of providing an SPL that is 15 
dBA greater than the ambient SPL.  Fortunately, strobes exist in the mechanical rooms 
to provide an additional means of notification per NFPA 72, 18.4.1.1. 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires all public and common use areas to 
have strobes per ADA-ABA 2004, Sect. 215 and Sect. 702.  The Wheelock MT 
Multitone Horn/Strobes have an adjustable strobe setting of 15 cd, 30cd, 75 cd, and 110 
cd.  The following table provides a maximum room size for each strobe rating.  The 
table is taken from NFPA 72 Table 18.5.5.4.1(a): 
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Table 22 - Maximum Room Size for One Strobe 
Maximum Room Size (ft) Min. Light Output – One 
Light per Room (cd) 
20 x 20 15 
28 x 28 30 
45 x 45 75 
54 x 54 110 
 
Table 23 - Maximum Room Size for Four Strobes 
Maximum Room Size (ft) Min. Light Output – Four 
Light per Room (cd) 
40 x 40 15 
50 x 50 30 
80 x 80 75 
100 x 100 110 
 
The common areas can be accommodated by a single strobe, however, according to 
the fire alarm drawings, not all strobes are set to an appropriate candela (cd) setting.  
The lobby is currently set to 15 cd and should be increase to 30 cd.  The North and 
South outdoor oasis should be increased to 110 cd.  All corridor strobes should be 
increased to 75 cd especially because of the curved design of some of the corridors.  
The wall mounted appliances are mounted between 80 and 96 inches above the 
finished floor to meet the requirements of NFPA 72, 18.5.5.1. 
6.7 Power Requirements 
The battery must be sized to provide enough power to run the fire alarm system for 24 
hours in supervisory mode and 5 minutes in alarm mode per NFPA 72, 10.6.7.2.1.  
Below are the calculations for the four power supplies located throughout the building: 
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Table 24 - Power Requirements 
 
 
 
Item
Alarm 
Current (A)
Time Factor 
(hr)
Alarm 
Amphours
20% Safety 
Factor
Total 
Amphours
NAC 1 0.903 0.083 0.075 0.015 0.090
NAC 2 0.627 0.083 0.052 0.010 0.062
NAC 3 1.044 0.083 0.087 0.017 0.104
FACU 0.075 0.083 0.006 0.001 0.007
Item
Standby 
Current (A)
Time Factor 
(hr)
Standby 
Amphours
20% Safety 
Factor
Total 
Amphours
FACU 0.075 24 1.8 0.36 2.16
TOTAL 2.424
POWER SUPPLY 1
Item
Alarm 
Current (A)
Time Factor 
(hr)
Alarm 
Amphours
20% Safety 
Factor
Total 
Amphours
NAC 1 0.42 0.083 0.035 0.007 0.042
NAC 2 0.64 0.083 0.053 0.011 0.064
NAC 3 0.32 0.083 0.027 0.005 0.032
NAC 4 0.32 0.083 0.027 0.005 0.032
FACU 0.075 0.083 0.006 0.001 0.007
Item
Standby 
Current (A)
Time Factor 
(hr)
Standby 
Amphours
20% Safety 
Factor
Total 
Amphours
FACU 0.075 24 1.8 0.36 2.16
TOTAL 2.337
POWER SUPPLY 2
Item
Alarm 
Current (A)
Time Factor 
(hr)
Alarm 
Amphours
20% Safety 
Factor
Total 
Amphours
NAC 1 1.088 0.083 0.090 0.018 0.108
NAC 2 1.14 0.083 0.095 0.019 0.114
NAC 3 1.184 0.083 0.098 0.020 0.118
FACU 0.075 0.083 0.006 0.001 0.007
Item
Standby 
Current (A)
Time Factor 
(hr)
Standby 
Amphours
20% Safety 
Factor
Total 
Amphours
FACU 0.075 24 1.8 0.36 2.16
TOTAL 2.507
POWER SUPPLY 3
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Each power supply is furnished with two, 7 Ah batteries, which are more than adequate 
according to the calculated battery requirements above. 
6.8 Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance – Fire Alarm System 
The current ITM requirements for fire alarm systems are applicable to both new and 
existing systems per NFPA 14.1.4.  The service personnel performing the ITM on a 
system is required to be experienced and qualified per NFPA 72, 14.2.3.6.  A test plan 
shall describe the scope of the testing and shall be provided to the service personnel 
prior to testing per NFPA 72, 14.2.10.1. 
NFPA 72 Table 14.3.1 provides a table to determine what components need to be 
visually inspected and how often.  NFPA 72 Table 14.4.3.2 provides a similar table, but 
with testing requirements.  Table 14.4.3.2 also provides the method for testing the 
components.  All equipment shall be maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s 
instructions per NFPA 72, 14.5.1.  The frequency of maintenance is determined by the 
type of equipment and the local ambient conditions per NFPA 72, 14.5.1. 
Sandia utilizes a program called Maximo to ensure all ITM requirements are met. 
Item
Alarm 
Current (A)
Time Factor 
(hr)
Alarm 
Amphours
20% Safety 
Factor
Total 
Amphours
NAC 1 0.334 0.083 0.028 0.006 0.033
NAC 2 0.42 0.083 0.035 0.007 0.042
NAC 3 1.031 0.083 0.086 0.017 0.103
FACU 0.075 0.083 0.006 0.001 0.007
Item
Standby 
Current (A)
Time Factor 
(hr)
Standby 
Amphours
20% Safety 
Factor
Total 
Amphours
FACU 0.075 24 1.8 0.36 2.16
TOTAL 2.345
POWER SUPPLY 4
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Table 25 - Fire Alarm ITM 
Component Visually Inspect Test 
All Equipment Annual [72:14.3.4] Initial Acceptance 
Trouble Signals Semiannual Annual 
DACT Annual Annual 
Batteries (Sealed 
Lead-Acid) 
Semiannual 
[72:10.6.10] 
Annual 
Remote 
Annunciator 
Semiannual Annual 
Remote Power 
Supplies 
Annual [72:10.6] Annual 
Air Sampling Semiannual 
[72:17.7.3.6] 
Annual 
Duct Detector Semiannual 
[72:17.7.5.5] 
Annual 
Fire Extinguishing 
System Switches 
Semiannual Annual 
Manual Fire Alarm 
Boxes 
Semiannual Annual 
Heat Detectors Semiannual Annual 
Smoke Detectors Semiannual Annual; Sensitivity 
Testing 
[72:14.4.4.3] 
Supervisory Signal 
Devices 
Quarterly Annual 
Waterflow Devices Quarterly Annual (electric); 
Semiannual 
(mechanical) 
Audible Appliances Semiannual Annual 
Visible Appliances Semiannual 
[72:18.5.5] 
Annual 
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 STRUCTURAL FIRE PROTECTION 7.0
7.1 Structural Fire Protection Classification 
The laboratory building is constructed entirely of Type II-B noncombustible materials per 
DOE Order 420.1.  The building is located on a 20 acre lot with no surrounding 
buildings.  This allows the building to maximize the allowable area increases found in 
IBC 506. 
7.2 Construction Classification 
In this section we will compare the actual building area to the tabulated building areas.  
We will also determine the allowable area increase due to frontage and sprinkler 
increase factors according to IBC 506. 
The laboratory building is a single story building with a few mechanical penthouses.  
The penthouses are not occupied; therefor the building will be treated as a one story 
building for the sake of calculating the allowable building area.  The following table list 
tabulated values for actual areas by occupancy type. 
Table 26 - Actual Floor Areas 
Occupancy Actual Area 1st Floor (𝒇𝒕𝟐) Actual Area Total Building (𝒇𝒕𝟐) 
B 62,512 69,996 
A-3 2,104 2,104 
F-1 8,085 8,085 
H-3 711 711 
H-5 9088 16,398 
TOTAL 82500 97294 
 
The building has an unusual shape which will be approximated as a rectangle for the 
sake of calculating the allowable area increase.  The following rectangular dimensions 
give an approximate area of 82,500 𝑓𝑡2: 
𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥.𝐵𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 = 254 𝑓𝑡 × 325 𝑓𝑡 = 82550 𝑓𝑡2 
Section 506 of the IBC contains many equations used for calculating the allowable area 
increase.  The main equation used to calculate area increase is IBC 506.1 Eq. 5-1: 
𝐴𝑎 = {𝐴𝑡 + [𝐴𝑡 × 𝐼𝑓] + [𝐴𝑡 × 𝐼𝑠 ]} 
Where: 
𝐴𝑎 = 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 (𝑓𝑡
2) 
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𝐴𝑡 = 𝑇𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 503 (𝑓𝑡
2) 
𝐼𝑓 = 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 (𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡. 506.2) 
𝐼𝑠 = 𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑙𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡. 506.3) 
Below is the calculation for 𝐼𝑓  taken from IBC 506.2 Eq. 5-2.  The entire perimeter is 
surrounded by a width of open space greater than 30 feet: 
𝐼𝑓 = [
𝐹
𝑃
− 0.25]
𝑊
30
 
𝑃 = 2(254 𝑓𝑡) + 2(325 𝑓𝑡) = 1158 𝑓𝑡 
𝐹 = 𝑃 (𝑑𝑢𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛 20 𝑓𝑡) 
𝑊 =
30(𝑃)
𝐹
=
30(1158)
1158
= 30 𝑓𝑡 
𝐼𝑓 = [
1158
1158
− 0.25]
30
30
= 0.75  
Certain occupancies meet the exception contained within IBC 506.2.1 which permits 
their width of public way (W) to be increased to a maximum of 60 feet which gives them 
the following frontage increase factor: 
𝐼𝑓 = [1 − 0.25]
60
30
= 1.5  
IBC 506.3 permits an increase of 300 percent for sprinklered buildings with only story 
above grade, therefore: 
𝐼𝑠 = 3  
The following spreadsheet takes the area increase factors calculated above, and 
determines the allowable area increase for each occupancy type: 
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Table 27 - Allowable Area Increase 
Occupancy 𝑨𝒂𝒄𝒕  (𝒇𝒕
𝟐) 𝑨𝒕  (𝒇𝒕
𝟐) 𝑰𝒇* 𝑰𝒔 𝑨𝒂  (𝒇𝒕
𝟐) Ratio 
B** 62,512 23,000 1.5 3 126,500 0.49 
A-3*** 2,104 9,500 1.5 3 52,250 0.04 
F-1** 8,085 15,500 1.5 3 85,250 0.09 
H-3**** 711 14,000 1.5 0† 35,000 0.02 
H-5 9,088 23,000 0.75 3 109,250 0.08 
SUM      0.72 
*506.2.1 – Where building meets IBC 507, width of public way is limited to a max of 60 
*507.3 – Considered an unlimited area building 
**507.6 – Considered an unlimited area building 
***507.8 – Considered an unlimited area building 
†
506.3 Exception – No sprink ler increase permitted 
 
All occupancies except for Occupancy B complied with their tabulated areas IBC Table 
503 prior to the allowable area increase.  Occupancy B did not originally comply with its 
tabulated value, but is in compliance after the allowable area increase calculation.  The 
last column of Table 27 above meets IBC 508.4.2 which states for separated 
occupancies, the sum of the ratios of the actual area divided by the allowable area must 
be less than 1. 
7.3 Construction Material Fire Resistance Requirements 
A Type II-B building requires the use of noncombustible materials.  The laboratory 
building is constructed of steel decks, steel bar joists, steel wide flange beams, and 
steel columns.  IBC Table 602 discusses the fire resistance rating for various building 
elements based on the construction type.  For a type II-B construction, no elements 
require a fire-resistance rating, including the primary structure, load bearing walls, 
interior nonbearing walls, floor construction, and roof construction. 
IBC Table 602 shows the rating requirements for exterior nonbearing walls.  The 
laboratory building has a fire separation distance greater than 30 feet on all sides, 
therefore, the exterior nonbearing walls don’t require a fire resistance rating. 
7.4 Occupancy Separation 
The laboratory building does not require fire protection on the building elements except 
for those that are part of a fire barrier.  A previous version of the IBC required the 
laboratory building to use the occupancy separation requirements in Table 28.  These 
separation requirements take into account the reduced values allowed by automatic 
sprinkler systems.  Table 29 shows the separation requirements for the current IBC 
(2012): 
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Table 28 - Required Sepatation (IBC - Older Version) 
USE A-3 B F-1 H-3 H-5 
A-3   1 2 3* 4* 
B     2 1 1 
F-1       1 1 
H-3         1 
*These uses are not adjacent.  They accomplish the required separation through the 
location of multiple rated walls. 
Table 29 - Required Separation (IBC 508.4 - 2012) 
USE A-3 B F-1 H-3 H-5 
A-3   1 1 2 2 
B     
 
1 1 
F-1       1 1 
H-3         1 
 
The older separation requirements were more stringent; therefore, the building exceeds 
the current code. 
IBC 707.5 requires the fire barriers to extend from the top of the foundation to the 
underside of the floor or roof sheathing.  IBC 707.6 limits the size of an opening in a fire 
barrier, however, the entire building is sprinklered therefore the openings are not limited 
to 156 square feet per Exception 1.  Openings in the fire barrier shall be protected in 
accordance with IBC 716.  Penetrations in the fire barrier shall be protected in 
accordance with IBC 714.  Joints in the fire barrier shall comply with IBC 715. 
 Fire Barrier - Column Fire Resistance Calculations 7.4.1
The laboratory building is constructed as a Type II-B building and does not require 
resistance on the structural columns. 
7.5 Prescriptive-Based Analysis Conclusion 
Based on analysis, the laboratory building meets the prescriptive requirements of the 
IBC.  The hydraulic calculations will need to be run through a computer model, such as 
AutoSprink, in order to verify the difference between the hand calculations and the 
contractor’s calculations. 
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 PERFORMANCE-BASED ANALYSIS 8.0
8.1 Disclaimer 
The following performance-based analysis uses hypothetical scenarios to analyze the 
building for life safety.  The scenarios are intended to be representative of hazards that 
exist in laboratory buildings in general.  The scenarios are not intended to identify the 
size and location of actual hazards.  Names and identifying details of the laboratory 
building have been modified to protect the privacy of Sandia.  The information in this 
report is meant to supplement frequent inspections of the building fire protection system 
and good housekeeping habits in order to maintain the optimum level of safety for the 
occupants and the building.  The fire hazards, calculation assumptions, and pass/fail 
criteria used for each scenario are conservative in order to provide a factor of safety to 
the occupants.   
8.2 Executive Summary 
A comprehensive performance-based analysis was performed on the laboratory building 
in order to ensure the safety of the occupants and the preservation of the equipment 
and facilities.  The prescriptive-based analysis ensures life safety by determining if the 
building meets all applicable code requirements.  The performance-based design also 
ensures life safety; however, it accomplishes this by applying appropriate fire scenarios 
to the building and running an analysis to determine if the occupants have enough time 
to escape the building before conditions become untenable.   
Based on the analysis, the laboratory building did not pass any of the three design 
scenarios; however, recommendations were offered for each scenario in order to 
maintain a safe egress for the occupants. 
8.3 Introduction to Performance-Based Design 
The performance-based analysis is another way of determining the life safety of a 
particular building.  The prescriptive-based analysis strictly follows the code which 
leaves very little room for flexibility.  A performance-based analysis must continue to 
meet the goal and objectives of the code; however, it provides alternatives to how the 
code can be achieved.  With more flexibility also comes more risk of human error by 
poor module design, inappropriate equivalencies, and incorrect calculations.  Designing 
a proper performance-based analysis requires appropriate interpretation of the goals, 
objectives, level of safety, appropriate fire scenarios, assumptions, and safety factors. 
A performance-based design can be used to prove an equivalent level of safety if a 
specific building code was not met, or the building contains an unusual trait that is not 
typically covered by the building code.  A performance-based analysis requires special 
consideration when choosing fire scenarios and their respective performance criteria.  
The fire scenarios must accurately represent fire hazards that can potentially occur in 
the building.  The performance criteria must be set to an appropriate threshold in order 
to ensure life safety while not being too stringent to make the fire scenarios impossible 
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to pass.  The fire protection engineer should state all assumptions and references in 
order to give the AHJ confidence in the analysis. 
8.4 Codes and References 
SFPE Engineering Guide to Performance-Based Fire Protection, 2nd Edition 
SFPE Handbook of FPE, 4th Edition (SFPE HB) 
2012 Edition, NFPA 101 Life Safety Code (LSC): Chapter 5 
8.5 Facility Description 
The unique building characteristics to the laboratory building will be highlighted in order 
to determine the most appropriate fire scenarios.  The laboratory building is a multi-
program laboratory where various research efforts are being conducted throughout the 
building.  The building is composed of office space and laboratory space with a portion 
of the building dedicated to high hazard use.  The laboratories will contain small 
amounts of chemicals which will be stored in flammable liquid storage cabinets when 
not in use.  The IBC limits the amount of hazardous chemicals that can be used or 
stored in a control area.  The maximum allowable quantities (MAQs) for each material 
type are listed in IBC Table 307.1(1).  The two blocks of lab space contain a 1-hour fire 
barrier on their perimeter which allows them to be considered a separate control area.  
The areas of the building that exceed the MAQ limits are considered high hazard 
occupancies. 
The building contains major hallways that run the entire length of the building.  The 
hallways serve as the main exit path for all the occupants in the building.  The 
laboratory building contains two open lobby/collaboration areas connected to the major 
hallways. 
The reminder of the building is dedicated to office use.  The east side of the building 
contains numerous single-occupant hard offices, whereas the west end contains large 
rooms filled with small cubicle spaces. 
8.6 Project Scope 
The performance-based analysis will consist of ensuring the fire protection systems for 
the laboratory building will perform through three fire scenarios.  The systems must 
protect all occupants to safe egress and prevent the fire from spreading beyond the 
room of origin.  The primary stakeholders are the building owner, the AHJ (DOE), the 
Building and Fire Safety (BFS) department, the tenants, the building operations and 
maintenance, and the emergency responders. 
The fire scenarios are chosen based on the building and occupant characteristics.  The 
performance criteria are established from the design goals and objectives.  The RSET is 
calculated using the method outline in the SFPE handbook as well as the use of the 
egress computer model Pathfinder.  The fire scenarios will be modeled using the fire 
dynamic simulator FDS. 
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8.7 Fire Protection Goals 
The SFPE Engineering Guide to Performance Based Design and the stakeholders’ 
objectives were used to define the goals of the design project: 
1. Life Safety: Minimize fire-related injuries and prevent undue loss of life 
2. Property Protection: Minimize fire-related damage to the building and its contents 
3. Mission Continuity: Minimize undue loss of operations and business-related 
revenue due to fire-related damage. 
The goals are intended to be broad statements about how a building is supposed to 
perform under a fire scenario. 
8.8 Stakeholder and Design Objectives 
The stakeholders’ objectives are intended to describe the maximum level of damage 
that would be tolerable.  After the stakeholder’s objectives have been determined, it is 
necessary to create design objectives by determining what aspects of the bui lding need 
to be protected.  The design objective includes acceptable fire conditions that need to 
be maintained in order to meet the stakeholders’ objectives. 
Stakeholder’s Objectives: 
1. Life Safety: Allow safe egress for all occupants outside the room of origin 
2. Property Protection: Prevent thermal damage 
3. Mission Continuity: Minimize smoke spread 
Design Objectives: 
1. Life Safety: Maintain tenable conditions 
2. Property Protection: Prevent flashover 
3. Mission Continuity: Prevent fire from spreading outside the room of origin 
8.9 Tenability Criteria 
The three major fire hazards associate with untenable conditions are smoke, heat, and 
toxicity from smoke products.  We will discuss in detail each hazard and how they 
contribute quantifiable performance criteria to the design objectives. 
 Visibility 8.9.1
Visibility is indirectly proportional to the smoke density (extinction coefficient) and 
directly proportional to emitted light that reaches the human eye.  The following is an 
equation for visibility determined by T. Jin for light emitting and light reflecting exit signs 
[1]: 
𝑉 =
8
𝐶𝑠
 (𝑚)          𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 
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𝑉 =
3
𝐶𝑠
(𝑚)          𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 
Where 𝐶𝑠 is the smoke density (extinction coefficient) in units of 1/m. 
A light emitting sign produces a higher intensity of light than a reflecting sign.  This 
analysis will use the visibility equation for a light reflecting sign to produce more 
conservative results.  The light reflectance value in FDS will be set to 3.  The results of 
Jin’s equation are shown in Figure 3 below.  The results show the inverse relationship 
between visibility and smoke density. 
 
Figure 3 - Smoke Density vs. Visibility of Light Emitting Sign 
Numerous visibility tests have been performed by researchers in the fire protection 
community in order to determine the most appropriate visibility distance for a 
performance criterion.  A brief description of these tests can be found in the SFPE 
Handbook 4th Edition, Section 2-4.  Test criteria posed by fire researchers varies from 
1.2 meters to 13.5 meters as shown in Table 2-4.3  The Fire Research Institute 
conducted a test [2] which required the subjects to insert a pin into different holes of 
decreasing size as the room filled with smoke.  The test equipment was able to record 
every time the pin contacted the rim of the hole.  A second test [3] was conducted by T. 
Jin and T. Yamada where they required subjects to solve math problems as they walked 
down a corridor filled with smoke.  The end of the corridor also contained heaters which 
radiated heat towards the subjects.  A similar pattern appeared in both of these tests.  
The initial cause of panic in the smoke filled room was the physical irritation to the eyes, 
throat, and nose.  After the subjects became conditioned to the physical discomfort, 
their performance in the smoke increased.  Finally, the performance decreased a final 
time when the subjects succumbed to the psychological fear of not knowing what was 
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going to happen next.  This psychological fear was brought on by increased smoke, 
walking further into the corridor, and experiencing a heating sensation (from the electric 
heaters).  People who are unfamiliar with the rooms performed worse than those 
familiar with it.  For our tenability requirements, we will take a conservative approach 
and assume that the room will contain people who are unfamiliar with the room.  We will 
use a visibility criterion of 13 meters found in SFPE Handbook Table 2-4.2.  The NFPA 
Fire Protection Handbook Sect. 3-11 states in most cases, visibility is the tenability 
criterion that dominates the hazard analysis. 
 Smoke Layer 8.9.2
The smoke layer is directly related to visibility, toxicity, and upper layer temperature.  If 
the smoke layer is maintained above a specified height, the occupants can safely 
egress without interference from the smoke harmful effects.  We will take our smoke 
layer height criterion from the IBC 909.8.1 which requires the smoke layer height to be 
maintained 1.83 meters (6 feet) above the highest occupied level. 
 Toxicity 8.9.3
Carbon monoxide is considered the most important asphyxiant gas.  This concept is 
demonstrated by the Strathclyde pathology study [4].  It has the ability to mix with 
hemoglobin in the bloodstream and create the oxygen reducing toxin, 
carboxyhemoglobin (COHb).  Carbon monoxide is always present in fires, it causes 
confusion and loss of consciousness, and it is the most common cause of death in fires.  
Loss of consciousness typically occurs at COHb levels of 40 percent, but can occur at 
levels as low as 30 percent.  The following figure taken from SFPE HB Fig. 2-6.5 
represent the time to incapacitation in active monkeys [5] [6].    At a concentration of 
1000 ppm CO and 2000 ppm CO, the time to incapacitation was approximately 27 
minutes and 14 minutes respectively. 
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Figure 4 - CO Concentration vs. Time to Incapacitation 
One of the most important variables related to CO uptake is the respiratory minute 
volume (RMV).  When respiration data [7] is combined with the Coburn-Forster-Kane 
equation [8] [9] (which accounts for the CO uptake and excretion through the lungs) a 
predictive time to incapacitation can be created based on various RMV values. This 
predictive model is graphed in Figure 5, taken from SFPE HB Fig. 2-6.14. The model 
calculates time to incapacitation for a 70 kg human at various respiratory minute 
volumes (RMV) in L/min.  Curve A represent an RMV of 8.5 L/min (resting), curve B in 
an RMV of 25 L/min (light work), and curve C is an RMV of 50 L/min (heavy work).  At 
1000 ppm CO (0.1 % CO), incapacitation occurs in 35 minutes on curve B and 17 
minutes on curve C. 
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Figure 5 - Time to Incapacitation for 70 kg human at different levels of activity 
Typically a CO concentration criterion of 2000 ppm is acceptable; however, due to the 
unknown size of occupants as well as their fitness level (pertaining to RMV) and 
familiarity of the facility, we will choose a more conservative criterion of 1000 ppm CO 
for our analysis. 
 Temperature 8.9.4
Room temperature can affect an occupant in three different ways.  Elevated 
temperatures can lead to hyperthermia (heat stroke), skin burns, and respiratory tract 
burns.  W.V. Blockley conducted some research [10] where he determined room 
temperature tenability for humans is limited by skin burns for temperatures great than 
120 C and hyperthermia for temperatures less than 120 C (dry air).  Hyperthermia is 
defined as a prolonged exposure to heat which raises the core body temperature 
causing blurred consciousness, illness, and eventually death.  The threshold for all of 
these harmful effects is magnified by air saturation.  Heat is most harmful in 100 percent 
saturated air because it prevents our sweat from evaporating and cooling ourselves.  
We will assume saturated air for our analysis due to the water produced by the fire as 
well as the activation of sprinklers.  The SFPE Handbook Figure 2-6.27 adapts the 
research conducted by Blockley: 
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Figure 6 - Thermal Tolerance for Humans 
Judging by the figure above, a tenable egress is feasible as long as the temperature 
stays below 60 C.  We will use a temperature criterion of 60 C. 
 Flashover 8.9.5
Room flashover is associated with fire and smoke spread outside the room of origin.  
When flashover occurs, the room integrity is compromised and the fire and smoke will 
no longer be contained to the room of origin.  This is especially important due to the 
open corridors that run the entire length of the building.  If smoke were to spread from a 
room to the corridor, major egress paths could be compromised.  Also, smoke spread 
could impact the functionality of highly sensitive test equipment in various laboratories.  
SFPE HB Sect. 3-6 describes how research [11] conducted by Thomas indicates the 
onset of flashover is typically represented by an upper gas layer of 500-600 C.  We will 
use the upper layer temperature of 500 C for our flashover criterion. 
 Performance Criteria Summary 8.9.6
Below is a table summarizing fire protection goals, design objectives, and their 
respective performance criteria: 
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Table 30 - Goals, Objectives, and Criteria 
Fire Protection 
Goal 
Stakeholder 
Objective 
Design Objective 
Performance 
Criteria 
Minimize fire-related 
injuries 
Allow safe egress 
for all occupants 
outside the room of 
origin 
Maintain tenable 
conditions 
Visibility > 13 m 
Smoke Layer Height 
> 1.83 m 
CO < 1000 ppm 
Room Temperature 
< 60 C 
Minimize fire-related 
damage to the 
buildings and its 
contents 
Prevent thermal 
damage 
Prevent Flashover 
Upper Layer 
Temperature < 500 
C 
Minimize undue loss 
of operations 
Minimize smoke 
spread 
Prevent fire and 
smoke from 
spreading outside 
the room of origin 
Upper Layer 
Temperature < 500 
C 
 
8.10 Egress Analysis 
 Egress Analysis Introduction 8.10.1
In this section we will layout the information necessary to calculate the total egress time.  
This section will not contain any egress calculations.  The fire scenarios found in 
Section 8.11 of this report will contain their own egress analyses for their respective 
occupant loads and exit layouts.  An egress analysis is used to calculate the RSET.  
The RSET is how long it will take for the occupants to exit the building.  The RSET 
includes detection time, alarm time, pre-movement time, and travel time.  The RSET is 
then compared to the ASET in order to determine if occupant have enough time to 
safely exit the facility.  The ASET is calculated by modeling fire scenarios and 
determining when they exceed the performance criteria.  The ASET must be greater 
than the RSET in order for a safe egress to occur.  If the ASET is less than the RSET, 
the building fails the fire scenario and corrective actions will be recommended to 
increase the ASET.  The following figure taken from NFPA HB Fig. 3.11.4 portrays the 
RSET vs. ASET calculations. 
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Figure 7 - Timeline for ASET vs. RSET 
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 Characteristic of Occupants 8.10.2
Table 31 - Characteristic of Occupants 
Characteristics Description 
Population The laboratory building is designed to have a total occupant 
load of 972. 
Alertness Work is only performed in the building during regular business 
hours and there are no resting/lodging areas within the facility.  
The occupants will be awake. 
Responsiveness Due to the lab work taking place in the laboratory building, 
occupants may be used to unusual smells which could make 
detection more difficult. 
Commitment SNL trains its employees quarterly and annually on the 
importance of safety in the workplace.  SNL employees are 
thoroughly committed to all safety activities  
Focal Point The occupants’ attention is drawn to the work on their desk or 
their lab bench. 
Physical/Mental 
Capabilities 
SNL trains its employees to be aware of the cues related to 
life safety. 
Role There is a good blend of leaders and followers, but people 
may attempt to lead more at work in order to stand out to their 
supervisor. 
Familiarity The laboratory building is not open to the public, therefore, 
only approved occupants are allowed in the building.  The 
laboratory is a guest research facility and may contain 
occupants who are new to the facility.  Not all occupants may 
be familiar with the layout of the building.  
Social Affiliation The population of office employees work better as a group 
than the population of lab employees due to the nature of their 
daily seating arrangement and close interaction with 
numerous coworkers. 
Condition The physical condition of occupants is at or slightly above 
average.  The occupants won’t be required to traverse stairs 
during their egress from the 1 story building. 
Gender Composed of a good mix of male and female. 
Age The population is mostly composed of young and middle aged 
adults. 
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 Egress Calculation Method 8.10.3
The following steps will be used to calculate the egress time for each fire scenario: 
Determine the occupant load for the room or building (𝑃) 
Determine the number of available exit doors from the room or building (𝐷) 
Determine effective width of each door (𝑊𝑒) 
Determine the specific flow of each door (𝐹𝑠) 
Calculate the flow capacity of each door (𝐹𝑐) 
Calculate the time of passage through all available doors (𝑡𝑝) 
Determine the pre-movement time (𝑡𝑝−𝑒 ) 
Calculate the detection time (𝑡𝑑) 
Calculate the escape time (𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑐) 
 Egress Assumptions 8.10.4
All occupants start egress at the same time.  Queuing will occur at the doors to the 
outside therefore the specific flow, 𝐹𝑠, will be the maximum specific flow, 𝐹𝑠𝑚 .  The 
speed of movement and the travel time will not be calculated due to the assumption of 
queuing.  The population will use all facilities in the optimum balance.  None of the 
private exits will be considered. 
 Pre-Movement / Movement Plan 8.10.5
The Pre-movement time is the time from when an occupant decides to leave to the time 
they actually begin egress movement.  Occupants may contribute to their pre-
movement times by doing the following activities before leaving: 
 Retrieving Keys 
 Putting on jacket and additional outerwear (in winter) 
 Saving data on computer 
 Locking/shutting down computers 
 Shutting off experiments 
 Safely storing chemicals 
 Powering down lab equipment 
 Notifying coworkers of need to evacuate 
 New employees or guests looking for guidance on where to go 
 Retrieving cell phone from lock box at entrance of building. 
8.11 Fire Scenarios 
Careful consideration must be taken to ensure appropriate fire scenarios are chosen for 
the building to be analyzed.  The following table highlights fire scenarios taken from 
various sources.  The table was used to determine the most appropriate scenarios for 
the laboratory building: 
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Table 32 - Design Fire Scenarios 
NFPA 101; 5.5.3 
Scenarios 
Common Scenarios Building Characteristics 
Occupancy-Specific Fire Intentionally set fire Visitors 
Ultrafast-developing fire in 
primary means of egress 
Electrical malfunction Chemical Storage 
Normally unoccupied room Smoking Cleanroom 
Concealed space next to 
large occupied room 
Equipment Located off-site (response 
time) 
Slowly developing fire, 
shielded from fire protection 
Carelessness  
Most Severe Fire Heating  
Outside Exposure Cooking  
Ordinary combustibles; fire 
protection ineffective 
  
  
The first column of the table pulls the eight required design fire scenarios from the LSC 
Sect. 5.5.3.  The second column pulls common scenarios from NFPA 805 and the “Fire 
in the US” report [12] by FEMA.  The third column considers building characteristics that 
could potentially play a significant role in a fire scenario. 
 Design Fire Scenario 1: Lobby – Electrical Fire 8.11.1
The first fire scenario is a fire containing computer equipment and a polyurethane chair.  
The fire occurs in a collaboration room adjoining the corridor.   
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Figure 8 – Fire Scenario 1 (Location) 
The room is filled with a few moveable tables and chairs as well as a single computer 
station.  The area is open to the corridor with decorative wooden slats separating the 
two spaces (See the figure directly below for a picture of the room).  Typically a room is 
not allowed to open up to the corridor, but IBC 1018.6 permits corridor continuity for a 
lobby, foyer, or reception room open to the corridor as long as the room maintains the 
same fire rating as the corridor.  The corridors are considered B occupancy and don’t 
require a fire-resistance rating per IBC Table 1018.1.  The collaboration area is used 
like a lobby to meet up with colleges or complete a quick task on the computer.  The 
collaboration area is not intended to be normally occupied.  Due to the transient nature 
of the collaboration area, we will assume it to be used like a lobby. 
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Figure 9 - Collaboration Area/Lobby 
The image below shows a picture of the computer work station.  The printer is assumed 
to be the ignition source with the keyboard, monitor, desktop tower, and black 
cushioned office chair all acting as secondary ignition items. 
 
Figure 10 - Lobby Computer Station 
For this scenario we will assume that water supply was accidently left off after routine 
testing, thus rendering the sprinkler system ineffective (LSC 5.5.3 (8)).  This scenario 
will take a close look at the hazard associated with having an open room adjoining the 
major egress corridor that runs the entire length and width of the building.   
8.11.1.1 Scenario 1: Heat Release Rates 
The following HRR graphs were taken from the SFPE HB Section 3-1.  The graphs 
show the HRR curve for an upholster chair, a monitor, a printer, and a keyboard.  The 
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HRR curves all have a growth rate of approximately 300 seconds.  The table below 
shows the sum of their peak HRR is 300 kW.  The FDS model will have a fire growth of 
300 seconds to 300 kW and then the HRR curve will level out at 300 kW for the 
remainder of the analysis.
 
Figure 11 - HRR Upholstered Chair [13] 
 
Figure 12 - HRR Printer [14] 
 
 
Figure 13 - HRR Monitor [15] 
 
Figure 14 - HRR Keyboard [15] 
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Table 33 - Lobby Peak HRR 
ITEM PEAK HRR (kW) 
Keyboard 23 
Monitor 35 
Desktop Tower 35 
Printer 100 
Chair 100 
TOTAL 293 
 
8.11.1.2 Scenario 1: Egress Analysis (Evacuation Time, 𝑡𝑒) 
The following tables show the egress calculations for the entire population of the 
laboratory building to egress out of the five major exits.  The entire population was 
chosen from this scenario because of the location of the fire and the impact the smoke 
in the major corridor poses on the escape route for all occupants. 
Table 34 - Flow Capacity of Doorway 
Flow Capacity of a Doorway 
Effective Width (SFPE HB Table 3-13.1 
Boundary Layer) 
𝑊𝑒 = 64” − 12” = 52” = 4.33′ 
Maximum Specific Flow (SFPE HB Table 
3-13.5 
𝐹𝑠𝑚 = 24.0 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑡⁄⁄  
Calculated Flow Capacity (SFPE HB 3-13, 
Eq. 8) 
𝐹𝑐 = 𝐹𝑠𝑊𝑒 = (24)(4.33)
= 𝟏𝟎𝟑.𝟗𝟐 𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒐𝒏 𝒅𝒐𝒐𝒓 𝒎𝒊𝒏⁄⁄  
 
Table 35 - Estimated Speed of Movement Through Doorway 
Estimate Speed of Movement Through Doorway 
Population Density (SFPE HB Figure 3-
13.8, evaluated at 𝐹𝑠𝑚 ) 
𝐷 = 0.175 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑓𝑡2⁄  
Evacuation Speed Constants (SFPE HB 
Table 3-13.2) 
𝑘 = 275 𝑓𝑡 𝑚𝑖𝑛⁄  
𝑎 = 2.86 𝑓𝑡2 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛⁄  
Speed of Travel (SFPE HB 3-13, Eq. 5) 𝑆 = 𝑘 − 𝑎𝑘𝐷 = 275 − (2.86)(275)(0.175)
= 𝟏𝟑𝟕.𝟒 𝒇𝒕 𝒎𝒊𝒏⁄  
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Table 36 - Time of Passage Through Doorways 
Time of Passage Through Doorways 
Population (SFPE HB 3-13, Eq. 10) 𝑃 = 972 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑠 
Time of Passage (SFPE HB 3-13, Eq. 10) 𝑡𝑝 = 𝑃 𝐹𝑐⁄  
=
972 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑠
5 𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑠 × 103.92 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑖𝑛⁄⁄
 
= 𝟏𝟏𝟐 𝑠𝑒𝑐 
 
The evacuation time is 112.2 seconds (1.87 minutes).  The SFPE HB 3-13, Eq. 2 
equates the total escape time to the pre-evacuation time plus the evacuation time: 
𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑐 = 𝑡𝑝−𝑒 + 𝑡𝑒 
8.11.1.3 Scenario 1: Egress Analysis (Pre-Movement Time, 𝑡𝑝−𝑒) 
The SFPE HB Sect. 3-12 has compiled some research [16] conducted by G. Proulx 
where he studied three Canadian government office buildings and determined an 
average evacuation time of 50 seconds.  The office buildings received no warning of the 
egress test; however, the occupants were relatively prepared due to annual training 
conducted by the building owner.  The buildings had an approximate occupant load of 
1000 people.  The building characteristics closely match those of the laboratory 
building: an occupant load is slightly less than 1000, emergency egress training 
conducted annually, and they are primarily office/lab space.  Due to the similar nature of 
the Canadian office buildings to the laboratory building, a pre-movement time of 50 
seconds will be assumed to complete the pre-evacuation tasks listed in section 8.10.5 
of this report.  The total evacuation time for the building population to exit out of the 5 
main exits is 183 seconds. 
𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑐 = 50 𝑠 + 112 𝑠 = 162 𝑠 (2.7 𝑚𝑖𝑛) 
Keep in mind that this escape time does not reflect the Require Safe Egress Time 
(RSET).  The RSET includes the detection time, 𝑡𝑑, and the notification time, 𝑡𝑛, which 
occur prior to pre-evacuation. 
𝑅𝑆𝐸𝑇 = 𝑡𝑑 + 𝑡𝑛 + 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑐  
8.11.1.4 Scenario 1: Egress Analysis (Detection Time, 𝑡𝑑 – Sprinkler Activation) 
The sprinklers are assumed to be ineffective for this fire scenario, however, we will still 
use a DETACT model to calculate a sprinkler activation time for comparison purposes. 
Assume the computer workstation fire starts at the south region of the lobby.  The fire 
starts on top of the desktop.  The desktop is located 30 inches off the ground.  The fire 
grows as a t-squared fire with a fire growth coefficient calculated as 𝛼 = 0.0035 𝑘𝑊/𝑚2 
in order to create a fire that grows to 300 kW in 300 seconds [17]. 
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First Detector Response Time: The lobby is open to the corridor therefore the area is 
assumed to be infinite; however, the area is partially enclosed therefore the DETACT 
model will be used for calculating the sprinkler response time.  A standard response 
sprinkler head is located 1.8 meters from the workstation.  Per NFPA 13, 3.6.1, a 
standard response sprinkler head has a response time index (RTI) of 145 (𝑓𝑡 ∙
𝑠)
1
2  [80 (𝑚 ∙ 𝑠)
1
2 ] or greater.  This value contradicts the Plunge Test by FM (FM 3210-
2007) Table 4.6.1.1.which states a 160 °𝐹 rated detector must have an RTI less than 
120 (𝑓𝑡 ∙ 𝑠)
1
2  [68 (𝑚 ∙ 𝑠)
1
2 ] in order to be considered a “standard response” detector.  We 
will use the larger RTI to make a more conservative calculation: 
𝑟 = 1.8 𝑚 
The following assumptions will be used in our calculations: 
𝑇0 = 20 °𝐶 (Ambient Temperature) 
𝑇𝑑 = 68.33 °𝐶 = 155 °𝐹 (Activation Temperature) 
The ceiling height is 9.5 feet, but because the fire occurs on a 30 inch high desktop, the 
revised ceiling height is: 
𝐻 = 9.5 𝑓𝑡 −
30
12
 𝑓𝑡 = 7 𝑓𝑡 = 2.1 𝑚 
The r/h ratio is: 
𝑟
𝐻
=
1.8 𝑚
2.1 𝑚
= 0.857 
The ratio of  
𝑟
𝐻
> 0.2, therefore, we can assume the detector is located in the ceiling jet 
region as opposed to the plume region.  Below is a table of parameters used to 
calculate the activation time of the detector: 
Table 37 - DETACT Parameters (Scenario 1 – Sprinkler Activation) 
INPUT PARAMETERS CALCULATED PARAMETERS 
Ceiling Height (H) 2.1 m r/H 0.857 
Radial Distance (r) 1.8 m dT(cj)/dT(pl) 0.332 
Ambient Temperature (To) 20 C du(cj)/du(pl) 0.227 
Activation Temperature (Td) 68.33 C     
Response Time Index (RTI) 80 (m-s)1/2     
Fire Growth Power (n) 2 -     
Fire Growth Coefficient (α) 0.0035 kW/s n^     
Time Step 2 s     
 
The transient heat release rate was calculated using the t-squared growth model: 
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?̇? = 𝛼𝑡2  
The change in plume temperature from ambient temperature as well as the plume 
velocity was calculated using the Alpert correlation for the plume region: 
Δ𝑇𝑔,𝑝𝑙 = 16.9
?̇?2/3
𝐻5/3
 
𝑢𝑔,𝑝𝑙 = (
?̇?
𝐻
)
1/3
 
The plume region values were used to calculate the ceiling jet values.  The change in 
ceiling jet temperature from ambient temperature as well as the ceiling jet velocity was 
calculated using the Alpert correlation for the ceiling jet region: 
Δ𝑇𝑔,𝑐𝑗 = Δ𝑇𝑔,𝑝𝑙
0.3
(𝑟/𝐻)2/3
 
𝑢𝑔,𝑐𝑗 = 𝑢𝑔,𝑝𝑙
0.2
(𝑟/𝐻)5/6
 
The detector temperature was calculated by plugging the ceiling jet temperature and 
velocity into an Euler equation: 
𝑇
𝑑
(𝑡+Δ𝑡)
= 𝑇𝑑
(𝑡) +
√𝑢𝑔
(𝑡)
𝑅𝑇𝐼
(𝑇𝑔
(𝑡) − 𝑇𝑑
(𝑡))Δ𝑡 
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Figure 15 - DETACT Results (Scenario 1 – Sprinkler Activation) 
Based on the graph above, the first sprinkler would activate 288 seconds after the fire 
began. 
Heat Release Rate at First Detector Response: Based on the graph above, the heat 
release rate at the time of activation is 290 kW. 
Uncertainty: The major uncertainty pertaining to this calculation is due the openness of 
the lobby to the corridor.  The ceiling jet may take longer to reach the activation 
temperature because heat is lost to the corridor.  The other uncertainty is related to the 
various reported RTI values from NFPA 13 and FM 3210. 
8.11.1.5 Scenario 1: Egress Analysis (Detection Time, 𝑡𝑑 – Detector Activation) 
The following DETACT model is based on a smoke detector activation.  The DETACT 
model requires an activation temperature input.  Activation temperatures are difficult to 
calculate for a photovoltaic smoke detector because they activate based on smoke 
obscuration and not temperature.  In NFPA 72 HB Table B.4.7.5.3, Schifiliti and Pucci 
combined data from Heskestad and Delichatsios to produce a table that approximates 
ceiling temperatures rise for smoke detector activation based on the fuel type.  We are 
primarily dealing with plastic electronic cases and a polyurethane chair, therefore, we 
will assume a scattering temperature rise of 7.2 °𝐶.  Assuming the ambient temperature 
is 20 °𝐶, the smoke detector will activate at a temperature of 27.2 °𝐶.  The RTI was set 
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to 1 due to the negligible lag time for a smoke detector.  The following table and figure 
show the DETACT model parameters and results for smoke detector activation: 
Table 38 - DETACT Parameters (Scenario 1 – Smoke Detector Activation) 
INPUT PARAMETERS CALCULATED PARAMETERS 
Ceiling Height (H) 2.1 m r/H 0.857 
Radial Distance (r) 1.8 m dT(cj)/dT(pl) 0.332 
Ambient Temperature (To) 20 C du(cj)/du(pl) 0.227 
Activation Temperature (Td) 27.2 C     
Response Time Index (RTI) 1 (m-s)1/2     
Fire Growth Power (n) 2 -     
Fire Growth Coefficient (α) 0.0035 kW/s n^     
Time Step 2 s     
 
 
Figure 16 - DETACT Results (Scenario 1 – Smoke Detector Activation) 
The smoke detector activates in 54 seconds.  The HRR at the time of activation is 10.2 
kW. 
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8.11.1.6 Scenario 1: Egress Analysis (Uses and Limitations) 
Performing hand calculations to estimate egress time requires assumptions that 
unrealistically optimize the facility.  In reality queuing would not instantly form and the 
building exits would not serve equal numbers of occupants during egress.  Since instant 
queuing is assumed, the actual time to move from one’s workstation to the door is also 
lost.  The total evacuation time calculated from this method should be considered a 
decent measurement prior to performing computer evacuation models.  The hand 
calculation may not be the best when it stands alone, but it can be very powerful when 
combined with a computer egress model for the purpose of validation. 
8.11.1.7 Scenario 1: Egress Analysis (Pathfinder) 
A computer model of the egress was replicated using Thunderhead Engineering’s agent 
based evacuation simulation program called Pathfinder.  Snapshots from the Pathfinder 
model of the laboratory building’s evacuation can be found in Appendix E. 
8.11.1.8 Scenario 1: Egress Analysis (Pathfinder – Assumptions) 
 The building is at maximum occupancy 
 The rooms don’t have furniture or equipment 
8.11.1.9 Scenario 1: Egress Analysis (Pathfinder – Calculations) 
A total evacuation in Pathfinder took 106.3 seconds.  The following figures show a 
summary of the simulation criteria and a graph of the remaining occupants versus time. 
 
Figure 17 - Pathfinder Results Summary 
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Figure 18 - Pathfinder Graph of Occupants vs. Time (Scenario 1) 
8.11.1.10 Scenario 1: Egress Analysis (Pathfinder – Uses and Limitations) 
The computer model does not account for things like human behavior during an egress.  
Some of the occupants in the model were exiting out of private exits that they normally 
wouldn’t.  The model also wasn’t optimizing exit out of spaces.  Occupants in the model 
would head for the nearest exit out of a space, where queuing was occurring, even 
though there were other available exits out of the space. 
8.11.1.11 Scenario 1: Egress Analysis (Comparison to Hand Calculation) 
The hand calculations estimated 112 seconds for the evacuation, which is about 6 
seconds longer than the computer model.  The results are very similar to each other, 
but they were achieved in different ways.  The major assumptions in the hand 
calculation were instant queuing and only the 5 main exits were used and none of the 
private exits were used.  The restriction in the computer model is the lack of balance 
among exits.  The computer model also accounts for movement from the occupant’s 
desk to the exit door instead of assuming instant queuing at the exits. 
8.11.1.12 Scenario 1: Egress Analysis (RSET) 
If we assume the notification time is negligible, the RSET for the lobby scenario, with 
sprinklers and smoke detectors, is calculated as: 
𝑹𝑺𝑬𝑻 (𝑺𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒌𝒍𝒆𝒓) = 𝑡𝑑 + 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑐 = 288 𝑠 + 162 𝑠 = 𝟒𝟓𝟎 𝒔 (𝟕.𝟓 𝒎𝒊𝒏) 
𝑹𝑺𝑬𝑻 (𝑺𝒎𝒐𝒌𝒆 𝑫𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓) = 𝑡𝑑 + 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑐 = 54 𝑠 + 162 𝑠 = 𝟐𝟏𝟔 𝒔 (𝟑.𝟔 𝒎𝒊𝒏) 
𝑹𝑺𝑬𝑻 (𝑰𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑫𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) = 𝑡𝑑 + 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑐 = 0 𝑠 + 162 𝑠 = 𝟏𝟔𝟐 𝒔 (𝟐.𝟕 𝒎𝒊𝒏) 
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The RSET using sprinklers would normally apply to this scenario; however, we are 
assuming the water supply to the sprinklers has been closed, rendering the sprinklers 
ineffective.  The fire is expected to reach a maximum HRR of 300 kW in 300 seconds.  
The first sprinkler takes 288 seconds to activate which occurs only 12 seconds before 
the fire reaches its max HRR.  This illustrates that even if the sprinklers were 
functioning, they would do very little to prevent the fire growth.  The RSET using smoke 
detectors would normally not apply to this scenario because there are no smoke 
detectors in the lobby.  We are calculating the RSET using a smoke detector in order to 
draw comparisons to the sprinkler and also to offer recommendations at the end of the 
performance-based analysis.  The RSET for the lobby scenario with inactive sprinklers 
is unknown because the detection time would be dependent upon an occupant noticing 
the fire and activating the manual pull station.  If an occupant is currently utilizing the 
lobby area when a fire breaks out, the detection time can be as little as 10 seconds (the 
time required to run to the nearest pull station).  If no occupants are in the lobby at the 
time of the fire, the detection time may be 5 minutes or greater depending on when the 
smoke reaches nearby office windows. 
8.11.1.13 Scenario 1: FDS Model 
The following is an image form Smokeview 4 minutes into the fire.  The smoke has 
already blocked 2 exits from the building and is spreading down the major corridors. 
 
Figure 19 - Scenario 1 FDS 
8.11.1.14 Scenario 1: Results 
The following FDS results will show when tenability was exceeded for each criteria 
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Table 39 - Scenario 1 (FDS Results) 
Criteria Instant 
Detection 
Smoke 
Detector 
Sprinkler 
Activation 
Reason 
RSET (s) 162 216 450  
Flashover Pass Pass Pass Upper layer temperature of 500 
C never exceeded 
Temperature Pass Pass Pass A room temperature of 60 C 
was never exceeded below a 
height of 1.8 m 
Visibility Pass 200 200 Visibility drops below 13 m from 
the E door to the NE door, 
blocking 2 exits. 
Smoke Pass Pass 220 The smoke layer descends 
below 6 feet at the E door in 
220 s, eliminating the most 
common exit 
CO Pass Pass Pass The CO concentration never 
exceed 1000 ppm 
 
The graphs and figures resulting from the FDS model can be found in Appendix M: 
Scenario 1 FDS Results. 
8.11.1.15 Scenario 1: Summary 
This scenario assumed the sprinkler system was ineffective; therefore, the detection 
time is dependent on manual activation.  Three different RSET time were calculated for 
scenario 1.  The first RSET of 162 seconds corresponds to a negligible detection time.  
The seconds RSET of 216 seconds corresponds to smoke detector activation.  The last 
RSET of 450 seconds corresponds to sprinkler activation.  The first criterion to fail is 
visibility at 200 seconds.  The first RSET passed the visibility criteria by only 38 seconds 
leaving very little time for manual detection.  Regardless of the sprinklers functioning or 
the installation of a smoke detector, the first scenario can only be successful if manual 
activation of a manual pull station occurs within 38 seconds of the fire starting. 
8.11.1.16 Scenario 1: Uncertainty 
The greatest uncertainty is the time to detection.  In order to compensate for the 
uncertainty, multiple RSETs were calculated. 
 Design Fire Scenario 2: Office – Heater Fire 8.11.2
The second fire scenario involved an office space heater located under a desk.  The 
office is made up of numerous cubicle offices, a conference room, a kitchen, and 12 
hard offices. 
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Figure 20 - Fire Scenario 2 (Location) 
Space heaters are frequently used in office settings where not all occupants are 
comfortable with the pre-established office temperature.  While an effort has been made 
to regulate space heater usage at Sandia, occasionally an unapproved (or a daisy-
chained) heater is spotted under an occupant’s desk.  The fire will begin under the desk, 
initially shielded from sprinkler protection; therefore, a small space heater fire spreads to 
become a workstation fire before sprinkler activation can occur.  In order to make a 
conservative calculation, it is assumed the workstation instantly catches fire at “𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 =
0”.  A shielded fire is the 5th required fire scenario from the LSC (LSC 5.5.3 (5)).   
8.11.2.1 Scenario 2: Heat Release Rates 
The HRR for a modern workstation was used from this scenario.  The HRR curve was 
obtained from the SFPE HB Sect. 3-1: 
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Figure 21 - HRR Workstation [18] 
The first sprinkler activated in 140 seconds at a HRR of 510 kW.  A sprinkler slightly 
closer to the fire would have activated around 129 seconds; however, the sprinkler has 
an intermediate-temperature rating of 200 °𝐹 per NFPA 13 Table 8.3.2.5(a).  The table 
requires all sprinklers heads within 2 feet 6 inches of a diffuser to have an intermediate-
temperature rating.  The FDS fire was modified to increase to 510 kW in 140 seconds.  
The FDS fire remained at 510 kW for the remainder of the model. 
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Figure 22 - HRR Workstation FDS 
8.11.2.2 Scenario 2: Egress Analysis (Evacuation Time, 𝑡𝑒 – Pathfinder) 
A Pathfinder model was used to calculate the escape time for fire scenario 2.  The 
pathfinder model didn’t account for the fourth exit located in the south east corner of the 
room due its close proximity to the fire.  The occupants in the office, where the fire 
occurs, will eventually exit the laboratory building, however, safe egress is assumed 
when they exit the office.  The office doors are normally closed.  The office doors will be 
open while the occupants exit the room, but they will automatically close after the last 
occupant exits.  The smoke escaping from the room while the occupants exit will be 
minimal relative to the volume of the corridors; therefore it is assumed that all other 
occupants in the building will safely escape the building.  The following figure shows the 
results from the Pathfinder model.  The occupants exited the office in 28 seconds: 
0
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Figure 23 - Pathfinder Graph of Occupants vs. Time (Scenario 2) 
8.11.2.3 Scenario 2: Egress Analysis (Pre-Movement Time, 𝑡𝑝−𝑒) 
In this scenario all of the occupants in the office area are considered intimate with the 
fire because they are located in the same room as the fire.  All of the pre-movement 
tests conducted by Proulx and other fire protection researchers identify pre-movement 
times for individuals who are not intimate with the fire.  For this scenario, we will develop 
our own pre-movement time based on the Station Nightclub Fire Timetable [19] from the 
SFPE HB Table 3-12.1.  The Station Nightclub Fire is relevant because most of the 
occupants were intimate with the fire.  We will also utilize some pre-evacuation 
influencing factors reported by Shi in the journal article, “Developing a Database for 
Emergency Evacuation Model.” [20] 
Table 40 - Pre-Movement Time (Scenario 2) 
Action Time (s) 
Reaction time (after 
noticing visible flame) 
10 
Notify others 10 
TOTAL 20 
 
Due to the intimacy of the fire, it is assumed the occupants will alert others by 
screaming while they exit the room.  It is also assumed, upon seeing flames and 
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hearing screaming, the occupants will instantly stand up and escape without gathering 
belongings and shutting down their computers. 
8.11.2.4 Scenario 2: Egress Analysis (Detection Time, 𝑡𝑑 – Sprinkler Activation) 
The sprinkler activation time was calculated using the FDS model.  The first sprinkler 
activated in 140 seconds. 
8.11.2.5 Scenario 2: Egress Analysis (RSET) 
If all the occupants in the office (including the hard offices) alerted to the fire by their 
coworkers screaming, the detection time is negligible.  The RSET is calculated as: 
𝑹𝑺𝑬𝑻 (𝑰𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒏𝒕 𝑫𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏) = 𝑡𝑑 + 𝑡𝑝−𝑒 + 𝑡𝑒 = 0 + 20 + 28 = 𝟒𝟖 𝒔 (𝟎.𝟖 𝒎𝒊𝒏) 
If the occupants located in the hard offices have their door closed and don’t hear the 
screaming and commotion from their coworkers, the detection time will be 140 seconds 
(when sprinkler activation occurs): 
𝑹𝑺𝑬𝑻 (𝒔𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒌𝒍𝒆𝒓) = 𝑡𝑑 + 𝑡𝑝−𝑒 + 𝑡𝑒 = 140 + 20 + 28 = 𝟏𝟖𝟖 𝒔 (𝟑.𝟏 𝒎𝒊𝒏) 
The two RSETs above are situational.  If the hard office doors are open while occupied, 
the first RSET with instant detection will apply.  If the hard office doors are normally 
closed and the occupant is currently listening to music, the seconds RSET with sprinkler 
activation will apply.  Both RSETs will be compared in the results section for scenario 2.  
8.11.2.6 Scenario 2: FDS Model 
The following image is a rendering taken from Smokeview moments after the fire 
begins: 
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Figure 24 - Scenario 2 FDS 
8.11.2.7 Scenario 2: Results 
The following table compiles the FDS results to determine when tenability was 
exceeded for each criterion 
Table 41 - Scenario 2 (FDS Results) 
Criteria Instant 
Detection 
Sprinkler 
Activation 
Reason 
RSET (s) 48 188  
Flashover Pass Pass Upper layer temperature of 500 C 
never exceeded 
Temperature Pass 165 A room temperature of 60 C was 
exceeded below a height of 1.8 m. 
Visibility Pass 80 Visibility drops below 13 m in the 
south office. 
Smoke Pass 100 The smoke layer descends below 6 
feet in the south office. 
CO Pass Pass The CO concentration never exceed 
1000 ppm 
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The graphs and figures resulting from the FDS model can be found in Appendix N: 
Scenario 2 FDS Results. 
8.11.2.8 Scenario 2: Summary 
Two different RSETs were calculated for Scenario 2.  The first RSET of 48 seconds 
corresponded to all occupants being alerted to the fire by the screams from their 
coworkers.  The model was successful using the first RSET.  The second RSET of 188 
corresponded to the occupants in the hard office not being alerted to the fire until the 
sprinkler activated.  The model was unsuccessful using the second RSET. 
 Design Fire Scenario 3 – High Hazard Occupancy Fire 8.11.3
The last fire scenario will occur in a high hazard occupancy, and it will involve a spill fire 
containing 5 gallons of acetone.  The amount and location of do not indicate the exact 
quantities and locations of chemicals in the laboratory building; however, the fire 
scenario is a good indication of possible hazards that may occur in any high hazard 
occupancy resulting from a spill fire. 
8.11.3.1 Scenario 3: Heat Release Rates 
The HRR, the area of the spill, and the burn time will all be calculated using the 
equations found in SFPE HB Sect. 2-15.  The volume of acetone in cubic meters is: 
∀= 5 𝑔𝑎𝑙 = 0.0189 𝑚3 
Spills involving 25 gallons or less are assumed [21] to have a spill depth of: 
𝛿 = 0.0007 𝑚 
The initial spill area is calculated by dividing the volume by the thickness: 
𝐴𝑠 =
∀
𝛿
=
0.0189 𝑚3
0.0007 𝑚
= 27 𝑚2 
Once the fuel is on fire, the spill expands to approximately 155 percent of the initial spill 
area.  The maximum area of the fire is: 
𝐴 = 1.55𝐴𝑠 = 1.55(27 𝑚
2) = 41.85 𝑚2 
The diameter of the maximum area is: 
𝐷 = √
4𝐴
𝜋
= √
4 × 41.85 𝑚2
𝜋
= 7.3 𝑚 
The mass burning rate per unit area found in SFPE HB Table 3-1.21 are for pools with 
diameters increasing to infinity.  Normally, we would modify this value by finding the 
limiting burning rate based using SFPE HB 2-15 Eq. 22: 
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?̇?′′ = ?̇?∞
′′ [1 − exp(−𝑘βD)] 
However, the previous equation is used for pool fires and not for spill fires.  It has been 
determined by numerous tests found in SPFE HB Sect. 2-15 that the spill mass burning 
rate is approximately one-fifth the maximum pool mass burning rate, therefore: 
?̇?′′ =
?̇? ∞
′′
5
=
0.041 𝑘𝑔 ∙ 𝑚−2 ∙ 𝑠−1
5
= 0.0082 
𝑘𝑔
𝑚2 𝑠
 
If we assume complete combustion, the steady state burning rate can now be 
calculated using the equation from SFPE HB Sect. 2-15 Eq. 24: 
?̇? = Δℎ𝑐?̇?
′′𝐴 = (25.8 
𝑀𝐽
𝑘𝑔
) (0.0082 
𝑘𝑔
𝑚2 𝑠
) (41.85 𝑚2) = 8853.8 𝑘𝑊 
In “An Introduction for Fire Dynamics” by Drysdale, the closed cup flashpoint for 
Acetone is reported as −14°𝐶.  If we assume the initial room temperature to be 20°𝐶, 
then the acetone spill fire will be gas phase-controlled.  A gas phase-controlled spill fire 
indicates the fire growth time is negligible, therefore, we will we assume the steady state 
burning HRR occurs instantaneously.  The total burn time of the fuel will be calculated 
using the volume of fuel, the expanded area of the spill, and the mass burning rate: 
𝑡𝑏 =
𝑚𝑓
?̇?′′𝐴
=
𝑉𝜌
?̇?′′𝐴
=
(0.0189 𝑚3) (791
𝑘𝑔
𝑚3
)
(0.0082
𝑘𝑔
𝑚2 𝑠
) (41.85 𝑚2)
= 43.6 𝑠 
The fire in the FDS model will ramp up to 8853.8 kW in 1 second, remain at that HRR 
for 43.6 seconds, and then ramp down to 0 in 1 second. 
8.11.3.2 Scenario 3: Egress Analysis (Evacuation Time, 𝑡𝑒 - Pathfinder) 
A Pathfinder model was used to calculate the escape time for fire scenario 3.  Safe 
egress is considered when an occupant passes through a horizontal exit.  The 
laboratory doors are normally closed.  The smoke escaping from the lab while the 
occupants exit will be minimal relative to the volume of the corridors; therefore it is 
assumed that all other occupants in the building will safely escape the building.  The 
following figure shows the results from the Pathfinder model.  The occupants exited the 
laboratory area in 14 seconds: 
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Figure 25 - Pathfinder Graph of Occupants vs. Time (Scenario 3) 
8.11.3.3 Scenario 3: Egress Analysis (Pre-Movement Time, 𝑡𝑝−𝑒) 
Not all of the occupants in the laboratory area are in the same room where the fire 
occurs; however, due to the nature of the high hazard occupancy, the occupants are 
trained to respond immediately to an alarm.  The pre-movement time will be calculated 
similarly to scenario 2; however, we will reduce the reaction time to 3 seconds: 
Table 42 - Pre-Movement Time (Scenario 3) 
Action Time (s) 
Reaction time (after 
noticing visible flame) 
3 
Notify others 10 
TOTAL 13 
 
It is assumed the occupants will alert others by screaming while they exit the room.  It is 
also assumed, upon seeing flames and hearing screams, the occupants will instantly 
stand up and escape without gathering belongings and shutting down their computers. 
8.11.3.4 Scenario 3: Egress Analysis (Detection Time, 𝑡𝑑) 
The high hazard occupancy is equipped with a High Sensitivity Smoke Detection 
(HSSD) system.  The HSSD can detect a fire within its incipient phase by taking active 
air samples of the return air before it is diluted with makeup air.  The area of the spill is 
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large and the fire reaches its max HRR in 1 second because it is gas phase controlled.  
We will assume the detection time is 3 seconds. 
8.11.3.5 Scenario 3: Egress Analysis (RSET) 
If we assume the notification time is negligible, the RSET for scenario 3 is calculated as: 
𝑹𝑺𝑬𝑻 (𝑯𝑺𝑺𝑫) = 𝑡𝑑 + 𝑡𝑝−𝑒 + 𝑡𝑒 = 3 + 13 + 14 = 𝟑𝟎 𝒔 (𝟎.𝟓 𝒎𝒊𝒏) 
8.11.3.6 Scenario 3: FDS Model 
The following image is a rendering taken from Smokeview moments after the fire 
begins: 
 
Figure 26 - Scenario 3 FDS 
8.11.3.7 Scenario 3: Results 
The following table compiles the FDS results to determine when tenability was 
exceeded for each criterion 
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Table 43 - Scenario 3 (FDS Results) 
Criteria Instant Detection Reason 
RSET (s) 30  
Flashover Pass Upper layer temperature of 500 C 
never exceeded 
Temperature 14 A room temperature of 60 C was 
exceeded below a height of 1.8 m. 
Visibility 14 Visibility drops below 13 m. 
Smoke 14 The smoke layer descends below 6 
feet. 
CO Pass The CO concentration never exceed 
1000 ppm 
 
The graphs and figures resulting from the FDS model can be found in Appendix O: 
Scenario 3 FDS Results. 
8.11.3.8 Scenario 3: Summary 
Although the high hazard area is equipped with an HSSD and automatic sprinklers, the 
hazards of a gas-phase controlled spill fire quickly make the main room untenable.  The 
fire reaches untenable condition in approximately 14 seconds, which is the same 
amount of time it takes occupants to evacuate the high hazard area (not including 
detection time and pre-evacuation time).  The sprinklers took approximately 17 seconds 
to activate.  The max HRR of the fire in not limited by the sprinklers because by the time 
sprinkler activation occurs, the fire has already reached its fuel limited max HRR.  The 
major assumption made for scenario 3 is that the spill and ignition occur simultaneously.  
In reality, there may be enough time between the spill and ignition to allow the 
occupants to escape or clean up the spill.  Scenario 3 was unsuccessful. 
8.12 Risk Analysis 
A qualitative risk analysis was performed following the FiRECAM risk model from SFPE 
HB Appendix 5-11.A.  The qualitative risk analysis does not determine the probability of 
a fire occurrence; however, it provides a useful index tool where the risk of each 
scenario can be ranked and compared to each other.  The results of the risk ranking 
can be used to determine which scenarios require a more in-depth qualitative analysis.  
The results will also be used to determine the priority level of the recommendations in 
the section 8.13. 
 Event Trees 8.12.1
An event tree was created for each of the three design fire scenarios.  The probability of 
each step within the event trees were initially filled in with quantitative descriptions and 
then converted over to probability values for use in probability calculations.  The 
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following table from SFPE HB Sect. 5-11 was used to convert quantitative descriptive to 
probability values: 
Table 44 - Values Associated with Probability Desctiption 
Quantitative 
Description 
Associated Value 
Very Low 0.05 
Low 0.3 
Moderate 0.5 
High 0.7 
Very High 0.95 
 
The following table was used to assign a consequence level to each scenario.  The 
table comes from SFPE HB Sect. 5-11.  The consequence level considers both the 
property loss and the occupant impact. 
Table 45 - Consequence Levels and Associated Loss Estimates 
Quantitative 
Description 
Property Loss 
($1000) 
Occupant Impact 
Very Low 0-5 No deaths or injuries 
Low 5-20 No deaths or injuries 
Moderate 20-100 No deaths, minor injuries 
High 100-1,000 No deaths, serious 
injuries 
Very High 1,000-10,000 Small number of deaths 
and injuries 
Extremely High >10,000 Multiple deaths and 
injuries 
 
Below are the event trees for the design fire scenarios.  Each possible outcome is 
assigned a scenario ID for use in the risk ranking: 
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Fire 
Location 
Manual 
Suppression 
Automatic 
Suppression 
Barriers 
Effective 
Fire 
Scenario 
Scenario 
Probability 
Scenario 
Consequence 
  
   
S11 0.3 Very Low   Yes 
  
  
0.3 
    
S12 0.21 Low Lobby   Yes 
   
  
0.3 
  
S13 0 Very Low   No   Yes 
  
0.7 
No 
0 
S14 0.49 
Extremely 
High   
 
0.7 
No 
      
1 
      
Figure 27 - Event Tree (Scenario 1 - Lobby) 
Notice that the probability for barrier effectiveness is 0 because a barrier does not exist 
between the lobby and the corridor.  Also, the probability of automatic suppression has 
been decreased from 0.95 to 0.3 because the sprinklers take too long to activate to be 
very effective. 
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Fire 
Location 
Manual 
Detection 
Manual 
Suppression 
Automatic 
Suppression 
Barriers 
Effective 
Fire 
Scenario 
Scenario 
Probability 
Scenario 
Consequence 
  
    
S21 0.21 Very Low   
 
Yes 
  
  
 
0.3 
    
S22 0.4655 Low   Yes   Yes 
 
  
0.7 
  
0.95 
  
S23 0.023275 Low     No   Yes 
    
0.7 
No 
0.95 
S24 0.001225 Very High Office   
 
0.05 
No 
    
  
0.05 
S25 0.09 Very Low     Yes 
  
    
0.3 
    
S26 0.1995 Low   No   Yes 
 
  
0.3 
  
0.95 
  
S27 0.009975 Very High   
 
No   Yes 
  
 
0.7 
No 
0.95 
S28 0.000525 Very High   
  
0.05 
No 
        
0.05 
      
Figure 28 - Event Tree (Scenario 2 - Office) 
Notice that a manual detection event has been added to the office design fire scenario.  
The manual detection event is supposed to represent whether the occupants in the hard 
offices are alerted to the fire by the screams of their coworkers. 
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Fire 
Location HSSD 
Manual 
Suppression 
Automatic 
Suppression 
Barriers 
Effective 
Fire 
Scenario 
Scenario 
Probability 
Scenario 
Consequence 
  
    
S31 0.0475 Very Low   
 
Yes 
  
  
 
0.05 
    
S32 0.27075 Moderate   Yes   Yes 
 
  
0.95 
  
0.3 
  
S33 0.6001625 Very High     No   Yes 
    
0.95 
No 
0.95 
S34 0.0315875 
Extremely 
High 
High 
Hazard   
 
0.7 
No 
    
  
0.05 
S35 0.0025 Very Low     Yes 
  
    
0.05 
    
S36 0.01425 High   No   Yes 
 
  
0.05 
  
0.3 
  
S37 0.0315875 Very High   
 
No   Yes 
  
 
0.95 
No 
0.95 
S38 0.0016625 
Extremely 
High   
  
0.7 
No 
        
0.05 
      
Figure 29 - Event Tree (Scenario 3 - High Hazard) 
An HSSD event has been added to the scenario 3 event tree.  The probability for 
manual and automatic suppression has been reduced due to the sudden overwhelming 
effects of a spill fire.  The scenario’s consequences are higher due to the value of the 
equipment in the high hazard area as well as the rapid fire growth leading to life loss. 
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 Risk-Ranking Matrix 8.12.2
The following matrix plots each outcome according to its probability and consequence.  
 
Probability of Scenario Occurrence 
Consequence 
Extremely 
Low 
(0.000-0.019) 
Very Low 
(0.020-0.039) 
Low 
(0.040-0.099) 
Moderate 
(0.100-0.299) 
High 
(0.300-0.499) 
Very High 
(0.500-1.000) 
Extremely High S38 S34     S14   
Very High S24, S28, S27 S37       S33 
High S36           
Moderate       S32     
Low   S23   S12, S26 S22   
Very Low S13, S35   S25, S31 S21 S11   
 
Key 
High Risk 
Moderate 
Risk 
Low Risk 
Negligible 
Risk 
Figure 30 - Risk-Ranking Matrix 
The following table is a breakdown of the outcomes that pose a risk based on the risk 
ranking matrix.  The table lists the highest risk scenarios in order starting from the top. 
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Table 46 - Description of most risk significant scenarios (descending order) 
Scenario ID Location Description 
S14 Lobby Lobby fire is not manually detected.  The fire is not 
suppressed by manual or automatic means.  The fire 
spreads beyond the room of origin. 
S33 High Hazard Spill fire detected by HSSD.  The fire is not suppressed by 
manual or automatic means.  The fire is contained in the 
room of origin. 
S34 High Hazard Spill fire detected by HSSD.  The fire is not suppressed by 
manual or automatic means.  The fire spreads beyond the 
room of origin. 
S38 High Hazard Spill fire not detected by HSSD.  The fire is not 
suppressed by manual or automatic means.  The fire 
spreads beyond the room of origin. 
S37 High Hazard Spill fire not detected by HSSD.  The fire is not 
suppressed by manual or automatic means.  The fire is 
contained in the room of origin. 
S32 High Hazard Spill fire detected by HSSD.  The fire is suppressed by 
automatic means. 
 
8.13 Conclusion and Recommendations 
The laboratory building passed all of the prescriptive-based design requirements except 
for the manual water supply calculation for the sprinkler system design.  The laboratory 
building did not pass the performance-based design criteria.  This section will offer 
prioritized recommendations to ensure maximum life safety while considering the cost to 
the owner for building modifications. 
 Recommendations 8.13.1
The following table lists the recommendations, based on the analysis, in a prioritized 
order: 
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Table 47 - Recommendations 
Priority Recommendation Reason 
1 Separate the two lobby 
areas from the corridor.  
Ensure the decorative 
wooden wall is enclosed or 
completely removed. 
The smoke spread form the first scenario 
proved that a lobby fire would impact the 
entire population.  The original 
recommendation was going to be the 
installation of a smoke detector to provide 
earlier detection than sprinkler activation; 
however, even with the installation of a smoke 
detector, the fire exceeded tenability limits 
before safe egress from the building.  
Separating the lobby from the corridor by 
means of a wall will prevent the smoke from 
spreading to the corridors and will also 
provide earlier sprinkler activation. 
2 Reduce the probability of a 
chemical spill in the high 
hazard area.  Reduce the 
potential spill area. 
The third scenario proves that a 5 gallon spill 
of acetone and instant ignition would certainly 
lead to life-loss for those intimate with the fire.  
We can reduce the probability of a spill ever 
occurring by working with the building owner 
to ensure liquid chemicals are being stored, 
dispensed and transported appropriately.  We 
will also work with the owner to determine if 
spill control, drainage, and containment is 
necessary where hazardous materials are 
used in order to reduce the area of a spill fire. 
3 Install manual pull stations 
at the exits of the two office 
blocks located in the center 
of the building. 
The second scenario proved to be fatal if the 
occupant in the hard offices were not quickly 
alerted to the fire.  The manual pull stations 
will allow the fire alarm to be activated long 
before an automatic sprinkler activates. 
4 Ensure proper ITM of all 
fire protection and life 
safety features. 
Proper ITM will ensure the sprinkler water 
supply is always on.  It will also ensure space 
heaters are being used appropriately and 
combustibles are not accumulating in the 
building. 
5 Verify the discrepancy 
between the designer’s 
sprinkler calculations and 
the hand calculations. 
By performing a more thorough sprinkler 
analysis with a computer program such as 
AutoSPRINK,, we can determine if a water 
pump is necessary to provide enough water to 
meet the demand. 
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 Conclusion 8.13.2
In general, a performance-based design must introduce fire hazards in order to assess 
the ability of the fire protection system to protect the occupants and the building from 
fire damage.  Although the laboratory building doesn’t pass the performance-based 
design, it does not imply a lack of safety to the occupants.  A qualitative risk analysis 
would need to be performed in order to determine the actual probability of these fire 
scenarios occurring.  The probability of the water supply being accidently turned off or a 
5 gallon acetone spill is low.  The results of this analysis should be used as a decision 
making tool to improve an already fire safe building.  
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 APPENDICES 9.0
9.1 Appendix A: Exits and Exit Signs 
 
Figure 31 - Exits and Exit Signs 
 
 Legend
Main Exit
Private Exit
Exit Sign
Directional Exit Sign
Combo (Exit + Directional)
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9.2 Appendix B: Occupant Loads 
 
Figure 32 - Occupancy Classification IBC 
Figure 32 is a layout of the laboratory building color coded for IBC occupancy 
classifications as well as corridors/aisles.  The Building is divided into smaller sections 
for occupant load calculations.  
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Figure 33 - OL Section 1 
 
 
Table 48 - OL Section 1 
Room Use 
Area 
(SF) Factor OL 
1204 Business 117 100 1 
1205 Business 115 100 1 
1206 Business 117 100 1 
1208 Business 118 100 1 
1211 Business 115 100 1 
1212 Business 121 100 1 
1213 Business 117 100 1 
1214 Business 121 100 1 
1215 Business 115 100 1 
1216 Business 121 100 1 
1220 Business 118 100 1 
1222 Business 118 100 1 
1223 Business 115 100 1 
1224 Business 117 100 1 
1225 Business 117 100 1 
1227 Business 118 100 1 
1229 Business 209 100 2 
TOTAL   2089   18 
   94 
 
 
Figure 34 - OL Section 2 
 
 
Table 49 - OL Section 2 
Room Use 
Area 
(SF) Factor OL 
1402 Business 111 100 1 
1404 Business 98 100 0 
1406 Business 98 100 0 
1408 Business 96 100 0 
1411 Business 219 100 2 
1412 Business 99 100 0 
1412A Business 86 100 0 
1412B Business 26 100 0 
1413 Business 122 100 1 
1414 Business 90 100 0 
1415 Business 182 100 1 
1417 Business 113 100 1 
1423 Business 42 100 0 
1425 Assembly 408 15 27 
1451 Business 113 100 1 
1452 Business 121 100 1 
1453 Business 118 100 1 
1454 Business 134 100 1 
1456 Business 134 100 1 
1458 Business 114 100 1 
1462 Business 115 100 1 
1464 Business 134 100 1 
1465 Business 118 100 1 
1466 Business 128 100 1 
1467 Business 120 100 1 
1468 Business 108 100 1 
TOTAL   3247   45 
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Figure 35 - OL Section 3 
 
 
Table 50 - OL Section 3 
Room Use 
Area 
(SF) Factor OL 
1603 Business 117 100 1 
1604 Business 115 100 1 
1605 Business 118 100 1 
1607 Business 118 100 1 
1611 Business 121 100 1 
1612 Business 115 100 1 
1613 Business 121 100 1 
1614 Business 118 100 1 
1615 Business 121 100 1 
1616 Business 115 100 1 
1621 Business 118 100 1 
1622 Business 115 100 1 
1623 Business 118 100 1 
1624 Business 118 100 1 
1625 Business 117 100 1 
1626 Business 207 100 2 
1628 Business 119 100 1 
TOTAL   2091   18 
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Figure 36 - OL Section 4 
 
 
Table 51 - OL Section 4 
Room Use 
Area 
(SF) Factor OL 
1501 * 564 200 2 
1504 * 577 200 2 
1506 * 129 200 0 
1507 * 134 200 0 
1508 * 549 200 2 
1510 * 275 200 1 
1511 * 275 200 1 
1512 * 376 200 1 
1513 * 171 200 0 
1515 * 1138 200 5 
1515A * 201 200 1 
1516 * 135 200 0 
1517 * 140 200 0 
1519 * 270 200 1 
1522 * 201 200 1 
1523 * 580 200 2 
1524 * 234 200 1 
1525 * 378 200 1 
1526 * 330 200 1 
1527 * 378 200 1 
1528 * 330 200 1 
1530 * 378 200 1 
1531 * 261 200 1 
1532 * 353 200 1 
1533 * 171 200 0 
TOTAL   8528   27 
*Intentionally left blank
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Figure 37 - OL Section 5 
 
Table 52 - OL Section 5 
Room Use Area (SF) Factor OL 
1902 Storage 308 300 1 
1904 Storage 210 300 0 
1910 Storage 408 300 1 
1912 Storage 66 300 0 
1914 Storage 67 300 0 
1916 Storage 66 300 0 
1918 Storage 66 300 0 
1920 Equip Rm. 94 300 0 
1930 Business 688 100 6 
1934 Equip Rm. 483 300 1 
1936 Business 268 100 2 
1938 Equip Rm. 66 300 0 
1942 Business 476 100 4 
1950 Equip Rm. 3519 300 11 
1951 Equip Rm. 736 300 2 
1952 Equip Rm. 536 300 1 
1954 Equip Rm. 911 300 3 
TOTAL   8968   32 
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Figure 38 - OL Section 6 
 
 
 
Table 53 - OL Section 6 
Room Use 
Area 
(SF) Factor OL 
1102 Business 541 100 5 
1103 Business 841 100 8 
1106 Business 561 100 5 
1108 Business 561 100 5 
1111 Business 561 100 5 
1112 Business 544 100 5 
1122 Business 547 100 5 
1123 Business 556 100 5 
1124 Business 281 100 2 
1127 Business 561 100 5 
1128 Business 561 100 5 
1131 Business 561 100 5 
1132 Business 542 100 5 
TOTAL   7218   65 
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Figure 39 - OL Section 7 
 
 
Table 54 - OL Section 7 
Room Use 
Area 
(SF) Factor OL 
1151 Assembly 423 15 28 
1152 Business 111 100 1 
1153 Business 117 100 1 
1154 Business 115 100 1 
1155 Storage 64 300 0 
1161 Business 138 100 1 
1162 Business 116 100 1 
1163 Business 119 100 1 
1164 Business 117 100 1 
1165 Storage 22 300 0 
1171 Business 116 100 1 
1172 Business 161 100 1 
1173 Business 116 100 1 
1174 Business 114 100 1 
1175 Storage 21 300 0 
1181 Business 115 100 1 
1182 Business 118 100 1 
1183 Business 116 100 1 
1184 Business 113 100 1 
Cubicles* Business 3343 100 33 
TOTAL   5675   76 
*The total area of section 7 is 5675 sq. ft.  The 
area for the “Cubicles” section was calculated by 
subtracting the area of the hard offices and the 
conference room from the total of 5675 sq. ft.
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Figure 40 - OL Section 8 
 
 
 
 
Table 55 - OL Section 8 
Room Use 
Area 
(SF) Factor OL 
1302 Business 542 100 5 
1303 Business 561 100 5 
1305 Business 561 100 5 
1307 Business 561 100 5 
1309 Business 561 100 5 
1311 Business 822 100 8 
1322 Business 542 100 5 
1323 Business 561 100 5 
1326 Business 559 100 5 
1327 Business 140 100 1 
1328 Business 559 100 5 
1331 Business 561 100 5 
1332 Business 541 100 5 
1337 Business 145 100 1 
TOTAL   7216   65 
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Figure 41 - OL Section 9 
 
 
Table 56 - OL Section 9 
Room Use 
Area 
(SF) Factor OL 
1351 Assembly 417 15 27 
1352 Business 116 100 1 
1353 Business 119 100 1 
1354 Business 116 100 1 
1355 Storage 63 300 0 
1361 Business 140 100 1 
1362 Business 116 100 1 
1363 Business 114 100 1 
1364 Business 117 100 1 
1365 Storage 21 300 0 
1371 Business 116 100 1 
1372 Business 119 100 1 
1373 Business 112 100 1 
1374 Business 117 100 1 
1375 Storage 21 300 0 
1381 Business 111 100 1 
1382 Business 118 100 1 
1383 Business 116 100 1 
1384 Business 112 100 1 
Cubicles* Business 3319 100 33 
TOTAL   5600   75 
*The total area of section 9 is 5600 sq. ft.  The 
area for the “Cubicles” section was calculated by 
subtracting the area of the hard offices and the 
conference room from the total of 5600 sq. ft.
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Figure 42 - OL Section 10 
 
 
Table 57 - OL Section 10 
Room Use 
Area 
(SF) Factor OL 
1023 Storage 160 300 0 
1024 Assembly 355 15 23 
1025 Assembly 819 15 54 
1026 Assembly 378 15 25 
1028 Assembly 484 15 32 
TOTAL   2196   134 
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Figure 43 - OL Section 11 
 
 
Table 58 - OL Section 11 
Room Use 
Area 
(SF) Factor OL 
North Court Assembly 1868 15 124 
TOTAL   1868   124 
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Figure 44 - OL Section 12 
 
 
Table 59 - OL Section 12 
Room Use 
Area 
(SF) Factor OL 
South Court Assembly 3200 15 213 
TOTAL   3200   213 
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 Figure 45 - OL Section 13 
 
 
 
Table 60 - OL Section 13 
Room Use Area (SF) Factor OL 
1021 Assembly 354 15 23 
1020 Waiting 224 15 14 
1001 Business 638 100 6 
1004 Storage 17 300 0 
1002 Storage 17 300 0 
1037 Storage 51 300 0 
1040 Waiting 224 15 14 
1041 Assembly 354 15 23 
1601 Storage 92 300 0 
1634 Equip Rm. 20 300 0 
1627 Equip Rm. 74 300 0 
1937 Storage 95 300 0 
1933 Equip Rm. 182 300 0 
1226 Storage 72 300 0 
1202 Equip Rm. 105 300 0 
1234 Equip Rm. 21 300 0 
TOTAL   2540   80 
*Section 13 consists of all other rooms that open 
directly to the main corridor.
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9.3 Appendix C: Travel Distance 
 
Figure 46 - Travel Distance Floor Plan 
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9.4 Appendix D: Fire Resistance Ratings 
 
Figure 47 - Fire Rated Walls 
 
 Legend
2 Hour Fire Rated Wall
1 Hour Fire Rated Wall
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9.5 Appendix E: Pathfinder Snapshots 
 
Figure 48 – Pathfinder: Simulated Evacuation 
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Figure 49 - Pathfinder: Spaces 
 
Figure 50 - Pathfinder: Occupants 3-D Simulation 
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9.6 Appendix F: Automatic Sprinkler System 
 
Figure 51 - Water Supply 
The point of connection is located at Node 0.  The risers connect to the looped fire line 
at node 2.  
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9.7 Appendix G: Sprinkler Head Detail 
 
Figure 52 - Sprinkler Head Detail 
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9.8 Appendix H: Hydraulic Calculations 
 
Figure 53 - Remote Areas 
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Figure 54 - Remote Area: Ordinary Hazard North System 
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Table 61 - Hydraulic Calculation of Ordinary Hazard North System 
 
Table 62 - Pressure Balance at Node A 
 
Project name: 0518 SNL CINT - Ordinary Hazard North System Date: Mar-14
L: 8.5 S: 10 D: 0.17Ste
p 
No. Pipe size
Pipe Fittings 
and Devices Node
q 14.5 1" Sch 40 L 11.83 C= 120 Pt 6.7 Pt k= 5.6
1 1 BL-1L 1.049 F 0 Pe Pv q = k * (Pt)^1/2
Q 14.5 T 11.83 pf 0.071 Pf 0.8 Pn Pt= 6.7
q 15.3 1" Sch 40 T-5 L 4.9 C= 120 Pt 7.5 Pt k= 5.6
2 2 BL-1L 1.049 F 5 Pe Pv
Q 29.8 T 9.9 pf 0.272 Pf 2.7 Pn
q 0.0 1" Sch 40 T-5 L 14.3 C= 120 Pt 10.2 Pt k= 0
4 q(3) 16.8 1.049 F 5 Pe 6.2 Pv Pe=14.3*0.433
Q 46.6 T 19.3 pf 0.623 Pf 12.0 Pn
q 0.0 4" Sch 10 L 6.6 C= 120 Pt 28.4 Pt k= 0
5 4.26 F 0 Pe Pv
Q 46.6 T 6.6 pf 0.001 Pf 0.0 Pn
q 0.0 4" Sch 10 L 8.8 C= 120 Pt 28.4 Pt k= 0
8 q(6,7) 152.6 4.26 F 0 Pe Pv
Q 199.2 T 8.8 pf 0.010 Pf 0.1 Pn
q 0.0 4" Sch 10 L 9.1 C= 120 Pt 28.5 Pt k= 0
11 q(9,10) 142.2 4.26 F 0 Pe Pv
Q 341.4 T 9.1 pf 0.027 Pf 0.2 Pn
q 0.0 4" Sch 10 L 8.1 C= 120 Pt 28.7 Pt k= 0.0
14 q(12,13) 101.3 4.26 F 0 Pe Pv
Q 442.8 T 8.1 pf 0.044 Pf 0.4 Pn
q 0.0 4" Sch 10 L 20 C= 120 Pt 29.1 Pt k= 0.0
17 q(15,16) 140.0 4.26 F 0 Pe Pv
Q 582.8 T 20 pf 0.072 Pf 1.4 Pn
q 0.0 4" Sch 10 T-20 (sch 10) L 187 C= 120 Pt 30.5 Pt k= 0.0
20 q(18,19) 142.3 4.26 T-20 (sch 10) F 79.2 Pe Pv
Q 725.0 T-20 (sch 10) T 266.2 pf 0.108 Pf 28.9 Pn
q 0.0 6" Sch 10 E-14; 45-7 L 171 C= 120 Pt 59.4 Pt k= 0.0
8 6.357 45-7; CV-32 F 83.16 Pe 4.8 Pv
Q 725.0 GV-3 T 254.16 pf 0.015 Pf 3.9 Pn
q L C= Pt 68.1 Pt
D
E
F
G
H
CM to 
BL-2
BL-1 
DN RN
CM to 
BL-3
4"CM 
to 
6"CM
6"CM 
to BOR
A
B
C
CM to 
BL-4
CM to 
BL-5
CM to 
BL-6
Pressure 
Summary
Normal 
Pressur Notes
Nozzle Ident 
and Flow in gpm
Equivalent 
Pipe Length
Friction loss 
(psi/ft)
Project name: 0518 SNL CINT - Pressure Balance at Node A Date:
L: 8.5 S: 10 D: 0.17
Step 
No. Pipe size
Pipe 
Fittings 
and 
Devices
q 14.5 1" Sch 40 T-5 L 7.1 C= 120 Pt 6.7 Pt k= 5.6
1 3 BL-1R 1.049 F 5 Pe Pv q(3) = A*D
Q 14.5 T 12.1 pf 0.071 Pf 0.9 Pn K(BL-1R)= 5.3
q 16.8 L C= Pt 7.5 Pt P(BL-1L)= 10.2
3 BL-1R F Pe Pv Since P(BL-1L)>P(BL-1R):
Q 16.8 T pf Pf Pn Q_act(BL-1R)=K(BL-1R)*P(BL-1L) (^0.5)
Notes
A
Nozzle Ident 
and Location Flow in gpm
Equivalent 
Pipe Length
Friction loss 
(psi/ft)
Pressure 
Summary
Normal 
Pressure
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Table 63 - Pressure Balance at Node C 
 
Table 64 - Pressure Balance at Node D 
 
Project name: 0518 SNL CINT - Pressure Balance at Node C Date:
L: 8.5 S: 10 D: 0.17
Step 
No. Pipe size
Pipe 
Fittings 
and 
Devices
q 14.5 1" Sch 40 L 8.6 C= 120 Pt 6.7 Pt k= 5.6
9 1 BL-3L 1.049 F 0 Pe Pv q(9) = A*D
Q 14.5 T 8.6 pf 0.071 Pf 0.6 Pn
q 15.1 1" Sch 40 L 11.8 C= 120 Pt 7.3 Pt k= 5.6
9 2 BL-3L 1.049 F Pe Pv
Q 29.6 T 11.8 pf 0.268 Pf 3.2 Pn
q 18.1 1.25" Sch 40 T-6 L 4.9 C= 120 Pt 10.4 Pt k= 5.6
9 3 BL-3L 1.38 F 6 Pe Pv
Q 47.6 T 10.9 pf 0.170 Pf 1.9 Pn K(BL-3L)= 13.6
q 72.5 L C= Pt 12.3 Pt P(CM-3)= 28.5
9 BL-3L F Pe Pv Since P(CM-3)>P(BL-3L):
Q 72.5 T pf Pf Pn Q_act(BL-3L)=K(BL-3L)*P(CM-3) (^0.5)
q 14.5 1" Sch 40 E-2 L 9.9 C= 120 Pt 6.7 Pt k= 5.6
10 1 BL-3R 1.049 F 2 Pe Pv q(10) = A*D
Q 14.5 T 11.9 pf 0.071 Pf 0.8 Pn
q 15.3 1" Sch 40 E-2 L 11.4 C= 120 Pt 7.5 Pt k= 5.6
10 2 BL-3R 1.049 E-2 F 4 Pe Pv
Q 29.8 T 15.4 pf 0.272 Pf 4.2 Pn
q 19.2 1.25" Sch 40 T-6 L 7.1 C= 120 Pt 11.7 Pt k= 5.6
10 3 BL-3R 1.38 F 6 Pe Pv
Q 48.9 T 13.1 pf 0.179 Pf 2.3 Pn K(BL-3R)= 13.1
q 69.7 L C= Pt 14.0 Pt P(CM-3)= 28.5
10 BL-3R F Pe Pv Since P(CM-3)>P(BL-3R):
Q 69.7 T pf Pf Pn Q_act(BL-3R)=K(BL-3R)*P(CM-3) (^0.5)
Notes
C
C
Nozzle Ident 
and Location Flow in gpm
Equivalent 
Pipe Length
Friction loss 
(psi/ft)
Pressure 
Summary
Normal 
Pressure
Project name: 0518 SNL CINT - Pressure Balance at Node D Date:
L: 8.5 S: 10 D: 0.17
Step 
No. Pipe size
Pipe 
Fittings 
and 
Devices
q 14.5 1" Sch 40 E-2 L 11 C= 120 Pt 6.7 Pt k= 5.6
12 1 BL-4L 1.049 F 2 Pe Pv q(12) = A*D
Q 14.5 T 13 pf 0.071 Pf 0.9 Pn
q 15.4 1" Sch 40 L 8.6 C= 120 Pt 7.6 Pt k= 5.6
12 2 BL-4L 1.049 F Pe Pv
Q 29.9 T 8.6 pf 0.273 Pf 2.4 Pn
q 17.7 1.25" Sch 40 L 11.8 C= 120 Pt 9.9 Pt k= 5.6
12 2 BL-4L 1.38 F Pe Pv
Q 47.5 T 11.8 pf 0.170 Pf 2.0 Pn
q 19.3 1.5" Sch 40 T-8 L 4.9 C= 120 Pt 11.9 Pt k= 5.6
12 3 BL-4L 1.61 F 8 Pe Pv
Q 49.2 T 12.9 pf 0.085 Pf 1.1 Pn K(BL-4L)= 13.6
q 73.1 L C= Pt 13.0 Pt P(CM-4)= 28.7
12 3 BL-4L F Pe Pv Since P(CM-4)>P(BL-4L):
Q 73.1 T pf Pf Pn Q_act(BL-4L)=K(BL-4L)*P(CM-4) (^0.5)
q 14.5 1" Sch 40 T-5 L 7.1 C= 120 Pt 6.7 Pt k= 5.6
13 1 BL-4R 1.049 F 5 Pe Pv
Q 14.5 T 12.1 pf 0.071 Pf 0.9 Pn K(BL-4R)= 5.3
q 28.2 L C= Pt 7.5 Pt P(CM-4)= 28.7
13 BL-4R F Pe Pv Since P(CM-4)>P(BL-4R):
Q 28.2 T pf Pf Pn Q_act(BL-4R)=K(BL-4R)*P(CM-4) (^0.5)
Notes
D
D
Nozzle Ident 
and Location Flow in gpm
Equivalent 
Pipe Length
Friction loss 
(psi/ft)
Pressure 
Summary
Normal 
Pressure
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Table 65 - Pressure Balance at Node E 
 
Project name: 0518 SNL CINT - Pressure Balance at Node E Date:
L: 8.5 S: 10 D: 0.17
Step 
No. Pipe size
Pipe 
Fittings 
and 
Devices
q 14.5 1" Sch 40 L 7.7 C= 120 Pt 6.7 Pt k= 5.6
15 1 BL-5L 1.049 F 0 Pe Pv q(9) = A*D
Q 14.5 T 7.7 pf 0.071 Pf 0.5 Pn
q 15.0 1" Sch 40 E-2 L 15.9 C= 120 Pt 7.2 Pt k= 5.6
15 2 BL-3L 1.049 F 2 Pe Pv
Q 29.5 T 17.9 pf 0.267 Pf 4.8 Pn
q 19.4 1.25" Sch 40 T-6 L 11.9 C= 120 Pt 12.0 Pt k= 5.6
15 3 BL-3L 1.38 F 6 Pe Pv
Q 48.9 T 17.9 pf 0.179 Pf 3.2 Pn K(BL-5L)= 12.5
q 67.6 L C= Pt 15.2 Pt P(CM-5)= 29.1
15 BL-3L F Pe Pv Since P(CM-5)>P(BL-5L):
Q 67.6 T pf Pf Pn Q_act(BL-5L)=K(BL-5L)*P(CM-5) (^0.5)
q 14.5 1" Sch 40 L 7.7 C= 120 Pt 6.7 Pt k= 5.6
16 1 BL-5R 1.049 F 0 Pe Pv q(10) = A*D
Q 14.5 T 7.7 pf 0.071 Pf 0.5 Pn
q 15.0 1" Sch 40 E-2 L 14.9 C= 120 Pt 7.2 Pt k= 5.6
16 2 BL-5R 1.049 F 2 Pe Pv
Q 29.5 T 16.9 pf 0.267 Pf 4.5 Pn
q 19.2 1.25" Sch 40 T-6 L 2.1 C= 120 Pt 11.7 Pt k= 5.6
16 3 BL-5R 1.38 F 6 Pe Pv
Q 48.7 T 8.1 pf 0.177 Pf 1.4 Pn K(BL-5R)= 13.4
q 72.4 L C= Pt 13.2 Pt P(CM-5)= 29.1
16 BL-5R F Pe Pv Since P(CM-5)>P(BL-5R):
Q 72.4 T pf Pf Pn Q_act(BL-5R)=K(BL-5R)*P(CM-5) (^0.5)
Notes
E
E
Nozzle Ident 
and Location Flow in gpm
Equivalent 
Pipe Length
Friction loss 
(psi/ft)
Pressure 
Summary
Normal 
Pressure
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Table 66 - Pressure Balance at Node F 
 
Project name: 0518 SNL CINT - Pressure Balance at Node F Date:
L: 8.5 S: 10 D: 0.17
Step 
No. Pipe size
Pipe 
Fittings 
and 
Devices
q 14.5 1" Sch 40 L 7.1 C= 120 Pt 6.7 Pt k= 5.6
18 1 BL-6L 1.049 F 0 Pe Pv q(9) = A*D
Q 14.5 T 7.1 pf 0.071 Pf 0.5 Pn
q 15.0 1.25" Sch 40 E-2 L 11.25 C= 120 Pt 7.2 Pt k= 5.6
18 2 BL-6L 1.38 E-2 F 4 Pe 1.2 Pv
Q 29.4 T 15.25 pf 0.070 Pf 1.1 Pn
q 17.2 1.25" Sch 40 L 10.9 C= 120 Pt 9.4 Pt k= 5.6
18 3 BL-6L 1.38 F 0 Pe Pv
Q 46.6 T 10.9 pf 0.164 Pf 1.8 Pn
q 18.8 1.5" Sch 40 T-8 L 5.9 C= 120 Pt 11.2 Pt k= 5.6
18 4 BL-6L 1.61 F 8 Pe Pv
Q 48.2 T 13.9 pf 0.082 Pf 1.1 Pn K(BL-6L)= 13.7
q 75.7 L C= Pt 12.4 Pt P(CM-6)= 30.5
18 BL-6L F Pe Pv Since P(CM-6)>P(BL-6L):
Q 75.7 T pf Pf Pn Q_act(BL-6L)=K(BL-6L)*P(CM-6) (^0.5)
q 14.5 1" Sch 40 L 7.1 C= 120 Pt 6.7 Pt k= 5.6
19 1 BL-6R 1.049 F 0 Pe Pv q(10) = A*D
Q 14.5 T 7.1 pf 0.071 Pf 0.5 Pn
q 15.0 1" Sch 40 E-2 L 4.25 C= 120 Pt 7.2 Pt k= 5.6
19 2 BL-6R 1.049 F 2 Pe Pv
Q 29.4 T 6.25 pf 0.266 Pf 1.7 Pn
q 16.6 1" Sch 40 E-2 L 3.75 C= 120 Pt 8.8 Pt k= 5.6
19 3 BL-6R 1.049 F 2 Pe Pv
Q 46.1 T 5.75 pf 0.609 Pf 3.5 Pn
q 19.7 1.25" Sch 40 E-3 L 11.25 C= 120 Pt 12.3 Pt k= 5.6
19 4 BL-6R 1.38 E-3 F 9 Pe Pv
Q 65.7 E-3 T 20.25 pf 0.309 Pf 6.3 Pn
q 24.1 1.5" Sch 40 T-8 L 4.1 C= 120 Pt 18.6 Pt k= 5.6
19 5 BL-6R 1.61 F 8 Pe Pv
Q 53.6 T 12.1 pf 0.100 Pf 1.2 Pn K(BL-6R)= 12.0
q 66.5 L C= Pt 19.8 Pt P(CM-6)= 30.5
19 BL-6R F Pe Pv Since P(CM-6)>P(BL-6R):
Q 66.5 T pf Pf Pn Q_act(BL-6R)=K(BL-6R)*P(CM-6) (^0.5)
Notes
F
F
Nozzle Ident 
and Location Flow in gpm
Equivalent 
Pipe Length
Friction loss 
(psi/ft)
Pressure 
Summary
Normal 
Pressure
   118 
 
9.9 Appendix I: Flow Test Summary Sheet 
 
Figure 55 - Flow Test Summary 
*The solid green line represents the water supply.  The dashed green line is the 85 percent water supply 
limit set by Sandia Spec 15310.  The red line is the sprink ler demand according to the manual 
calculations performed in “Appendix H: Hydraulic Calculations”.  The red dashed line is the 500 gpm hose 
stream allowance for the manually calculated demand.  The purple line is the sprink ler demand according 
to the designer’s calculations.  The dashed purple line is the 500 gpm hose stream allowance for the 
designer’s demand. 
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9.10 Appendix J: Fire Alarm System 
 
Figure 56 - FACP Location 
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9.11 Appendix K: Fire Alarm System Location and Spacing 
 
Figure 57 - Fire Alarm System (SE Region) 
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Figure 58 - Fire Alarm System (E Region)  
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Figure 59 - Fire Alarm System (NE Region)  
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Figure 60 - Fire Alarm System (S Region)  
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Figure 61 - Fire Alarm System (Center Region)  
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Figure 62 - Fire Alarm System (N Region) 
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Figure 63 - Fire Alarm System (SW Region)  
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Figure 64 - Fire Alarm System (W Region) 
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9.12 Appendix L: Wheelock Horn/Strobe 
 
Figure 65 - Wheelock MT Horn Strobe 
 
Table 67 - Horn Current and Sound Pressure Ratings 
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Table 68 - Strobe Current Ratings 
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9.13 Appendix M: Scenario 1 FDS Results 
. 
Flashover Criteria: Tupper layer = 500  °C 
Figure 66 - Scenario 1 (Upper Layer Temperature – Flashover) 
 
 
Flashover Criteria: T = 60 °C 
Figure 67 - Scenario 1 (Temperature) 
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Visibility Criteria = 13 m 
Figure 68 - Scenario 1 (Visibility) 
 
 
Smoke Layer Criteria = 1.8 m 
Figure 69 - Scenario 1 (Smoke Layer Height) 
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Carbon Monoxide Criteria = 1000  ppm  
Figure 70 - Scenario 1 (Carbon Monoxide) 
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9.14 Appendix N: Scenario 2 FDS Results 
. 
Flashover Criteria: Tupper layer = 500  °C 
Figure 71 - Scenario 2 (Upper Layer Temperature – Flashover) 
 
 
Flashover Criteria: T = 60 °C 
Figure 72 - Scenario 2 (Temperature) 
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Visibility Criteria = 13 m 
Figure 73 - Scenario 2 (Visibility) 
 
 
Smoke Layer Criteria = 1.8 m 
Figure 74 - Scenario 2 (Smoke Layer Height) 
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Carbon Monoxide Criteria = 1000  ppm  
Figure 75 - Scenario 2 (Carbon Monoxide) 
 
 
Carbon Monoxide Criteria = 1000  ppm  
Figure 76 - Scenario 2 (Carbon Monoxide Concentration) 
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9.15 Appendix O: Scenario 3 FDS Results 
. 
Flashover Criteria: Tupper layer = 500  °C 
Figure 77 - Scenario 3 (Upper Layer Temperature – Flashover) 
 
 
Flashover Criteria: T = 60 °C 
Figure 78 - Scenario 3 (Temperature) 
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Flashover Criteria: T = 60 °C 
Figure 79 - Scenario 3 (Temperature) 
 
 
Visibility Criteria = 13 m 
Figure 80 - Scenario 3 (Visibility) 
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Smoke Layer Criteria = 1.8 m 
Figure 81 - Scenario 3 (Smoke Layer Height) 
 
 
Carbon Monoxide Criteria = 1000  ppm  
Figure 82 - Scenario 3 (Carbon Monoxide) 
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